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IN THE STATIONHOUSE
AFTER DICKERSON
Charles D. Weisse/berg*
INTRODUCTION
Miranda v. Arizona1 established the high water mark of the protec
tions afforded an accused during a custodial interrogation. During the
decades that followed, the United States Supreme Court allowed
Miranda's foundation to erode, inviting a direct challenge to the
landmark ruling. In Dickerson v. United States,2 the Court turned back
such a challenge and placed Miranda upon a more secure, constitu
tional footing. This Article explores the impact of Dickerson in the
place where Miranda was meant to matter most: the stationhouse.
As I have described elsewhere, Supreme Court decisions have in
fluenced a number of California law enforcement agencies to instruct
officers that they may continue to interrogate suspects in custody who
have asserted their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent or right to
counsel.3 Harris v. New York" and Oregon v. Hass5 permit some state
ments taken in violation of Miranda to be used for impeachment pur
poses at trial. Michigan v. Tucke-I' and Oregon v. Elstad7 permit some
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I am grateful to Evan Caminker, Margaret Dundon, Richard Leo, Kay Levine, Robert
Post, Mark Rosenbaum, Stephen Sugarman, and participants at the University of Michigan
Law Review's Symposium and Boalt Hall's Center for Social Justice workshop for their ad
vice and assistance. I owe particular debts to Yale Kamisar for inspiring me (and others) to
study interrogation practices and to Andrew Stein for first introducing me to police training
in California.
Together with my colleagues and students, I have served as co-counsel for the plaintiffs
appellees in Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1 999) and for amici
curiae in People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal. 1998) and Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct.
2326 (2000). A law student, Victoria Wong, argued Butts under my supervision. My work in
these cases has shaped many of my views, but the opinions expressed here (and, of course,
any errors) are my own.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
3. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84
(1998).
4. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
5. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
6. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
7. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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derivative use of such statements.8 These rulings
together with
other decisions labeling Miranda's procedures as merely "prophylac
tic"9 - have created incentives for police to disregard Miranda and
have led to a different way of thinking about its core holding. Propo
nents of this different view, which I have called the "new vision" of
Miranda,10 have claimed that Miranda sets forth a nonconstitutional
rule of evidence that need only be followed when officers seek a
statement to introduce in the prosecution's case-in-chief at trial. 1 1 By
transforming Miranda from an affirmative constitutional command
governing conduct in the stationhouse into a weak rule of evidence,
the new vision has encouraged officers to continue to question sus
pects who have asserted the right to counsel or the right to remain si
lent. During the last decade, the practice has become so pervasive in
some jurisdictions that it has acquired its own moniker: questioning
"outside Miranda."12
This Article argues that Dickerson firmly rejects the "new vision"
and asks whether the ruling may foster new respect for Miranda and
adherence to its commands. The Article explores the Court's reaf
firmation of the constitutional basis for Miranda and discusses the ef
ficacy of exclusionary rules and civil rights actions in enforcing
Miranda's procedures. Most police officers are not lawyers and do not
read advance sheets. Court decisions can influence officers' conduct
only if the holdings are accurately transmitted to them. This Article
thus examines how law enforcement officials are instructed following
Dickerson and other recent Miranda cases, and explores whether offi
cers are likely to follow their training.
Part I briefly reviews interrogation training in the last decade, par
ticularly in California, and discusses the holdings in Dickerson and
three other recent Miranda decisions from lower courts, including one
civil rights action. Part II examines the instruction of officers in
California in the wake of these cases. Although the training is not uni
form, and may not be given in all parts of California, officers are now
being encouraged to comply with Miranda. It appears to have taken a
palpable threat of civil liability and, perhaps, Dickerson to force this
change. Part III discusses the conditions under which the new training
may actually alter interrogation practices in the stationhouse. The
Article argues that the new training may prove effective if law en·

8. In Tucker, the Court declined to suppress the testimony of a trial witness whose iden
tity was discovered through a statement in violation of Miranda. 417 U.S. at 450. In
Elstad, the Court ruled that a statement given after proper warnings would not be sup
pressed as the fruit of an earlier unwarned statement. 470 U.S. at 309.
9. E.g. , Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446.
10. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 132.
1 1. See id. at 132-40.
12. See id. at 133-37.
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forcement supervisors themselves take Miranda's commands seriously
and work to change norms within their departments. Finally, the
Article explores the use of civil rights actions to vindicate Miranda
rights after Dickerson and concludes that the risk of civil rights liabil
ity is important in changing departmental norms.
I.

INTERROGATION PRACTICES, THE COURTS AND D ICKERSON

A.

Questioning "Outside

Miranda" in California

Before describing police practices in California, one might ask
whether it is worth examining what occurs in a single state and
whether California's practices have spread to other jurisdictions.
There is some evidence of Miranda noncompliance outside of
California,13 though I have not undertaken to examine training in
other jurisdictions and I make no claims about the prevalence of ques
tioning "outside Miranda" elsewhere. Nevertheless, even in the event
that questioning "outside Miranda" is confined to California,
California is the nation's most populous state14 and has the largest
criminal justice system of all the states.15 Whether or not California's
police practices are representative of those in other jurisdictions,
California has a large chunk of the nation's criminal investigations and
prosecutions, and what happens in California is therefore significant in
its own right.
Consistent with the "new vision" of Miranda, many police officers
in California have been trained during the last decade that Miranda's
rules are merely nonconstitutional "recommended" or "suggested"
guidelines that must be followed only when officers seek a statement
13. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 137-38 (collecting cases); see also United States v.
Acosta, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (describing plan by FBI agent to ignore
requests for counsel); Hendrickson v. State, 688 S.W.2d 295 (Ark. 1985) (officers deliber
ately questioned over an invocation of the right to counsel); State v. Burris, 679 A.2d 121,
124-25 (N.J. 1996) (police interrogated suspect despite clear invocation of right to counsel);
State v. Sosinski, 750 A.2d 779, 782-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (prosecutors in
structed officers not to Mirandize suspect so that he would think he was not in custody);
Peter Erlinder, Getting Serious About Miranda in Minnesota: Criminal and Civil Sanctions
for Failure to Respond to Requests for Counsel, 27 WM . MITCHELL L. R EV . 941, 964-67
(2000) (describing refusal of FBI agent to respect assertion of right to counsel).
14. In 2000, the population of California was 33,871,648, 12% of the total population of
the United States. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Thi. 2, Resident Population of the 50 States,
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico: Census 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/
population/www/cen2000/respop.html#t2 (last visited Apr. 20, 2001).
15. In 1998, California law enforcement officials made 1 ,565,431 nontraffic arrests (15%
of the 10,291,317 nontraffic arrests made by all the states), including 340,602 arrests for FBI
index crimes (19% of the 1 ,774,193 arrests for FBI index crimes made by all states). See FED.
BUREAU OF INVEST., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIF. CRIME REPS., CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES (1998) tbl. 30 (Arrests, Number and Rate) & tbl. 69 (Arrests by State). "Index"
crimes include murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated as
sault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson.
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that will be admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief at trial.16 This
training has been promulgated by state law enforcement agencies,
such as the Attorney General's office and the California
Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training ("POST"). 17
The instruction has also occurred in counties and cities within
California, though it is also true that some agencies have rejected the
practice and have told officers to respect a suspect's Miranda invoca
tion.18 Despite the efforts of some agencies to urge respect for
Miranda, "outside Miranda" training has had a significant impact in
California, as demonstrated by the reported cases with "outside
Miranda" issues.19 This training has led to several legislative efforts at
reform, which have not yet proved successful.20
"Outside Miranda" instruction emphasizes that Miranda describes
only a value-neutral rule of evidence; it does not embody a constitu
tional command. Thus, there is nothing legally or morally wrong in in
terrogating a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel or the right
to remain silent. Questioning over an invocation merely has an eviden
tiary consequence at trial.21 It is therefore perfectly legitimate to ques16. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 133-37. In Tucker, the Court called Miranda's safe
guards "recommended" and "suggested," though it is clear from the context that the Court
did not mean that Miranda's procedures could be unilaterally scrapped. See Tucker, 417 U.S.
at 443-44.
17. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 133-34. POST is part of the California Department
of Justice. See CAL . PENAL CODE § 13500 (2000). It develops training programs and stan
dards for law enforcement officers. See CA L. PENAL CODE §§ 13503(e) (2000), 13510(a)
(2000 & Supp. 2001), 1351 1 (2000 & Supp. 2001).
18. See infra Section Il.C.
19. See infra Section LB; see also Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 136-37. There are no em
pirical studies showing the prevalence of this practice in police departments throughout
California. In 1992-93, however, Richard Leo observed 182 interrogations conducted by po
lice in three northern California departments. Suspects invoked their rights in thirty-eight
interrogations. Officers continued to question "outside Miranda" in seven of those thirty
eight cases (18%). See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 (1996).
20. In 1999, a bill was introduced in the California State Assembly declaring "the intent
of the Legislature" that officers cease questioning a suspect in custody who has invoked his
or her Miranda rights. A.B. 1326, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal., as amended Jan. 14, 2000). The
bill was voted out of committee but died while Dickerson was pending in the Supreme
Court. On March 19, 2001, another bill was introduced in the California State Senate with
the same declaration, but also with a provision to prohibit "outside Miranda" training. See S.
B. 121 1 , 2001-02 Reg. Sess. (Cal., as amended May 15, 2001). The bills and their histories are
available at http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm (last visited May 29, 2001).
21. See, e.g., CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA PEACE OFFICERS LEGAL
§ 7.40a (Rev. Mar. 1997) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK] (on file with author)
("An uncoerced (voluntary) statement obtained 'outside' Miranda (without complying with
Miranda) may not be used during trial as part of the prosecutor's case-in-chief. . . . However,
it can be used during the 'rebuttal' portion of the trial to impeach a defendant . . . . ); id. ,
§ 7.40b ("[T]he Miranda decision is not a code of conduct setting forth how police must con
duct their investigations in the field . . . . Rather, the Miranda opinion simply sets out a 'series
of recommended "procedural safeguards''. . . .' ) (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 443-44);
Videotape: Questioning: "Outside Miranda" (Greg Gulen Productions 1990), transcript re-

SOURCEBOOK

"

"
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tion a suspect even after she has asserted her Fifth
Amendment rights, to obtain additional information (such as the loca
tion of physical evidence, the names of witnesses, the identities of ac
complices, or the accused's methods of operation) or to force the de
fendant to commit to a statement that will prevent her from asserting
a new defense at trial. Of course, any such statement cannot itself be
used in the case-in-chief at trial. But, in the words of a proponent of
this tactic, "you can accomplish all of these legitimate purposes that
don't have anything to do with the prosecution of the case, and some
that do, by talking to the guy 'outside Miranda. ' "22 Officers trained in
this fashion perceive no downside to questioning "outside Miranda."
Investigators who respect an invocation of a suspect's rights and stop
questioning will obtain no information from a suspect. On the other
hand, questioning over an invocation may yield useful information,
even if that information has a limited use at trial.
I have argued elsewhere that this theory and training is not faithful
to the language, history, or purposes of Miranda.23 Nor does it cohere
with Edwards v. A rizona,24 which holds that an accused who has "ex
pressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel . . . is
not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has
been made available to him" unless the suspect reinitiates contact or
communication with the officers.25 A significant number of law en
forcement trainers, however, have not read Miranda or Edwards to
bar such continued questioning.26

printed in Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1 91 :

The Miranda exclusionary rule is limited to the defendant's own statement out o f his mouth.
That is all that is excluded under Miranda. It doesn't have a fruits of the poisonous tree the
ory attached to it the way constitutional violations do. When you violate Miranda, you're not
violating the Constitution. Miranda is not in the Constitution. It's a court-created decision
that affects the admissibility of testimonial evidence and that's all it is. So you don't violate
any law. There's no law says [sic] you can't question people "outside Miranda." You don't
violate the Constitution. The Constitution doesn't say you have to do that. It's a court deci
sion. So all you're violating is a court decision controlling admissibility of evidence. So
you're not doing anything unlawful, you're not doing anything illegal, you're not violating
anybody's civil rights, you're doing nothing improper. The only consequence of your talking
to somebody who has invoked his rights is "we will not be able to use his statement in the case
in chief in trial against him.
22. See id. at 192.
23. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 122-25, 140-53, 162-67.
24. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
25. Id. at 484-85; see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (holding that
Edwards' protection does not cease once a suspect actually consults with counsel).
26. This narrow reading of Miranda and Edwards is not confined to law enforcement.
See Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing
Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 907, 916-28 (1989) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment can only be violated at trial and,

hence, courts should care only about the admission of Miranda-violative statements, not
whether Miranda is breached in the stationhouse).
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Miranda"

Because so many officers have been instructed that it is permissible
to interrogate "outside Miranda,'' a series of cases challenging this
practice have reached the state and federal courts. Along with
Dickerson, these decisions have �ignificantly affected formal police
training in California.
1.

People v. Peevy

A number of defendants have argued to California state courts
that statements taken in deliberate violation of Miranda and Edwards
should not be admissible for impeachment under Harris v. New York
and that the tactic of questioning "outside Miranda" was sufficient to
render their statements involuntary under the Fourteenth
Amendment. An involuntary statement is inadmissible for any pur
pose, including impeachment.2 7 Most intermediate appellate courts to
face the issue have strongly criticized the practice of questioning "out
side Miranda. "28 But not all intermediate appellate courts agreed. In
People v. Branscombe,29 the court endorsed the "new vision" of
Miranda, holding that "[p]olice officers are presented with a choice they may cease questioning upon defendant's invocation of the right
to remain silent or they may continue their discussion with the suspect
and therefore lose the benefit of that evidence in the prosecution's
case-in-chief. "30
The question reached the California Supreme Court in 1998 in
People v. Peevy.31 Airreque Peevy was arrested for attempted robbery

27. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978).
28. See, e.g., In re Gilbert E., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866, 868 (Ct. App. 1995) ("When the po
lice deliberately step over the line and disobey Supreme Court pronouncements, respect for
the rule of law necessarily diminishes."); People v. Bey, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 28, 30-31 (Ct. App.
1993) ("This is a very troubling case, presenting a deliberate police violation of Miranda
coupled with a misrepresentation to appellant about the legal consequences of that viola
tion."); People v. Montano, 277 Cal. Rptr. 327, 337 (Ct. App. 1991) ("No tolerance can be
given to the officers' flagrant trampling of defendant's rights, particularly because (officers]
began the interrogation with no intention of respecting those rights." (footnote omitted));
People v. Baker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 475, 478 (Ct. App. 1990) ("Fortunately, the trial court here
was well aware of the unlawfulness of the police conduct and stated that it intended to initi
ate steps to prohibit the San Diego Police Department from using ["outside Miranda"] pro
cedures in the future.").
29. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773 (Ct. App. 1998), depublished, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 4252 (June 24,
1998).
30. Id. at 778.
31. 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1042 (1998). In a death penalty case
decided a year earlier, the California Supreme Court noted that officers had questioned the
defendant after his request for counsel. See People v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 544 (Cal. 1997).
The court criticized the officers, stating that their conduct "was unethical and it is strongly
disapproved." Id. at 567.
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by San Bernardino County sheriff's deputies, who questioned him af
ter he asked for an attorney.32 One deputy testified that "I kept talking
with him for impeachment purposes."33 Peevy's "outside Miranda"
statement was later used to impeach him at trial.34
On May 7, 1998, the California Supreme Court unanimously ruled
that the Harris exception applies even when a statement is taken in
deliberate violation of Miranda and Edwards.35 Peevy did not assert
that his statement was involuntary; consequently, that issue was not
addressed.36 The court also left open the question whether a statement
would still be admissible for impeachment if there was proof of a
widespread practice on the part of the police to ignore a Miranda in
vocation.3 7
Though Peevy permits the impeachment use of a statement taken
deliberately "outside Miranda," all seven justices also unequivocally
rejected the claim that Miranda and Edwards merely establish a value
neutral rule of evidence that may be disregarded at an officer's elec
tion. Those cases impose "an affirmative duty upon interrogating offi
cers to cease questioning once a suspect invokes the right to coun
sel. . . . Nothing in the language of Harris or Oregon v. Hass, for
example, suggests that the court now considers the Miranda or
Edwards rules as constituting mere advice regarding preferred police
conduct."38 The court declared that a statement is excluded under
Miranda and Edwards because "the evidence was obtained illegally"39
and described questioning after an invocation as "police miscon
duct."40 Soon thereafter, the justices also "depublished" Branscombe,
removing its ability to serve as precedent.41
Peevy filed a petition for writ of certiorari. In its response, the
California Attorney General asked the U.S. Supreme Court to take
32. See Peevy, 953 P.2d at 1215.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 1216.
35. See id. at 1219. Part of the reason for the holding is that, under the California
Constitution, statements taken in violation of Miranda may be excluded only to the extent
required by the federal Constitution. See id. at 1214.
36. See id. at 1221 n.2.
37. See id. at 1225-28. The court declined to take judicial notice of "outside Miranda"
training materials because the issue of police training was not raised in the trial court and
because the materials did not specifically pertain to the San Bernardino County Sheriff's of
fice. See id. at 1227 n.4. Justice Stanley Mosk wrote separately to indicate that if the defen
dant had established that he was questioned pursuant to a policy to violate Miranda, his
statement would not be admissible under Harris. See id. at 1228-32 (Mosk, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 1224 (citation omitted).
39. Id. at 1225.
40. Id.
41. People v. Branscombe, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 4252 (June 24, 1998). An unpublished
opinion "shall not be cited or relied on by a court or a party." CAL. R. er. 977(a).
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the case and "once and for all clarify that non-coercive non
compliance with Miranda does not constitute 'illegal' or 'unlawful'
conduct."42 On December 7, 1998, the Court denied the petition.43
Peevy contains an unambiguous statement from California's high
est court, decrying the practice of questioning over a Miranda invoca
tion. But the overall message to officers was muddied. By holding that
statements taken in deliberate violation of Miranda are still admissible
for impeachment, the court left wholly intact the incentive for officers
to continue to violate Miranda and, perhaps, gave the impression that
state courts would be willing to look the other way.
2.

Henry v. Kernan

As one might also expect, issues about these interrogation prac
tices eventually reached the federal circuit court. On May 26, 1999, the
court of appeals decided Henry v. Kernan,44 reversing the denial of a
habeas corpus petition in a second-degree murder case. Henry was in
terrogated by Sacramento County sheriff's deputies after he asked for
counsel. Shaken, confused and frightened, he gave a rambling and
disjointed statement, which was used to impeach him at trial.45
In granting relief, the Ninth Circuit noted that the officers' refusal
to honor Henry's invocation "was designed to generate a feeling of
helplessness," and "it was successful."46 The court concluded that "the
slippery and illegal tactics" of the officers overcame Henry's will and
made his statements involuntary and thus inadmissible for any pur
pose.4 7 In addition to questioning after his invocation of the right to
counsel, one of the deputies misled Henry about the effect of a state
ment, saying that "what you tell us we can't use against you right
now . . . . We'd just would like to know."48
The State sought rehearing in Henry, arguing that Henry's state
ments were voluntary up to the point that the misleading assurances
were given. Denying rehearing, the court strengthened its opinion,
42. Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Peevy v. California (No. 98-6125)
(Nov. 6, 1998). Professor Paul G. Cassell and the Washington Legal Foundation also asked
the Supreme Court to take the case, stating that "[a]mici are deeply concerned that the con
clusion below about the 'illegality' of noncoercive questioning outside of the Miranda rules
will unnecessarily discourage police officers from questioning suspects . . . . " Brief of Amici
Curiae Washington Legal Foundation et al. at 2, Peevy v. California (No. 98-6125) (Nov. 12,
1998).
43. Peevy v. California, 525 U.S. 1042 (1998).
44. 177 F.3d 1 152 (9th Cir. 1999), amended by 197 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1198 (2000).
45. See Henry, 197 F.3d at 1025, 1027.
46. Id. at 1028.
47. Id. at 1027-28.
48. Id. at 1029.
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underscoring that the sheriff's deputies "set out in a deliberate course
of action to violate Miranda. "49 The Supreme Court subsequently de
nied the State's petition for writ of certiorari.50
Henry should have sent a strong signal that questioning "outside
Miranda" is impermissible and may jeopardize a prosecution. Officers
who question over a Miranda invocation run the risk that a court will
find any resulting statements involuntary because of the psychological
impact of this practice upon a suspect. At the same time, however, be
cause Henry broke down during the interrogation and was told that
his statements could not be used against him, some might read the
case as a limited holding about false promises and voluntariness.
3.

California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts

In 1995, a federal civil rights lawsuit was filed against officers in the
Los Angeles and Santa Monica Police Departments, and against those
respective cities, seeking to stop police from questioning "outside
Miranda." The plaintiffs in California A ttorneys for Criminal Justice v.
Butts51 were two associations of criminal defense lawyers and two indi
viduals who had been questioned in violation of Miranda and
Edwards. Both individual plaintiffs were interrogated after they une
quivocally sought counsel. In April 1996, the federal district court
dismissed the portion of the case brought by the two bar associations,
finding that they lacked standing to seek injunctive relief.52 The court
permitted the case to go forward on behalf of the two individual plain
tiffs, rejecting the defendants' claim that Harris permits officers to
question "outside Miranda" to obtain impeachment information.53 The
case subsequently went to the court of appeals on the officers' inter
locutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity.54
49. Id. The court also emphasized that under the California Evidence Code, statements
admitted for impeachment are also admitted for the truth of the matters asserted. Id. (citing
CAL. E VI D. CODE §§ 1220, 1235).
50. Kernan v. Henry, 528 U.S. 1 198 (2000).
5 1 . 922 F. Supp. 327 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
52. See id. at 330-34.
53. See id. at 336 ("The impeachment exception was certainly not intended to provide
the police with the option of either ceasing questioning or continuing onward in the hopes of
acquiring impeachment evidence.").
54. The district court considered cross motions for summary judgment. The court nar
rowed the case by dismissing the Fourteenth Amendment causes of action, but held that the
plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claims should go to trial. See Order Re: Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment Argued August 11, 1997, at 2-5, Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Justice v. Butts
(CV 95-8634-ER) (Aug. 26, 1997); Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Adjudication; Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal; and
Granting Defendants' Request for Stay Pending Appeal on Qualified Immunity Issue at 2-6,
Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Justice v. Butts (CV 95-8634-ER) (Oct. 16, 1997). In so ruling, the court
reaffirmed its previous denial of qualified immunity to the defendant officers. See Order re:
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra, at 5.
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On November 8, 1999, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of
qualified immunity.55 The court determined that the plaintiffs had al
leged constitutional claims. Although "[i]n the narrowest sense"
Miranda "is a prophylactic rule, not a constitutional right," Miranda
"cannot be viewed entirely apart from the constitutional rights that it
protects."56 Moreover, while under circuit authority a bare violation of
Miranda may not be enough to establish a § 1983 action, the two plain
tiffs additionally alleged that officers made assurances that the plain
tiffs' statements could not be used against them and, in one case, deni
grated the role of counsel.57 The court also ruled that the
constitutional right was clearly established and that reasonable officers
should have known that their actions violated the plaintiffs' Miranda
rights.58 Echoing Peevy, the court expressly rejected the claim that
Harris v. New York, Oregon v. Hass and Michigan v. Tucker affirma
tively permit officers to question suspects who have invoked their
rights: "The Supreme Court has never suggested . . . that these deci
sions dealing with the peripheral use of statements obtained in viola
tion of Miranda somehow overcame Miranda's imperatives concerning
proper police procedure."59 Finally, and perhaps most significant to of
ficers in California, the circuit found that police could not escape li
ability by arguing that they relied upon their "outside Miranda"
training in good faith.60 The court concluded that "[o]fficers who inten
tionally violate the rights protected by Miranda must expect to have to
defend themselves in civil actions."61
The officers sought Supreme Court review. The Court denied their
petition for a writ of certiorari on June 26, 2000,62 the same day that
Dickerson was decided.

55. 195 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2717 (2000).
56. Id. at 1045.
57. See id. at 1046-48. The court followed an earlier case, Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d
1220, 1244 (9th Cir. 1992) (en bane), where a § 1983 action was permitted to go forward on
behalf of a former suspect who was questioned in violation of Miranda and subjected to abu
sive tactics. The Cooper court noted that "[t)his case does not establish a cause of action
where police officers continue to talk to a suspect after he asserts his rights and where they
do so in a benign way." Id. By ruling that the claim should go to trial in Butts, the court de
termined that the plaintiffs had at least alleged that the questioning "outside Miranda" was
not "benign."
58. See Butts, 195 F.3d at 1047.
59. Id. at 1048.
60. See id. at 1049 ("[T]hat Los Angeles and Santa Monica may have trained their police
to violate the rights of individuals does not provide any defense for these officers. Their pol
icy contradicts the safeguards provided by Miranda, and, at the very least, is in direct conflict
with Cooper [v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992) (en bane)).").
61. Id. at 1050.
62. Butts v. McNally, 120 S. Ct. 2717 (2000).
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In some respects, Butts is factually similar to Henry: In both cases,
officers told the suspects that because they invoked their Miranda
rights, their statements could not be used against them. Thus, some
might also read Butts narrowly for the proposition that questioning
over a Miranda invocation, coupled with false promises, violates the
Constitution. But that is not a fair reading of the case. B utts strongly
rejects the notion that Harris, Hass and Tucker allow officers to elect
to question "outside Miranda. " Further, if a simple violation of
Miranda is not by itself a Fifth Amendment violation and additional
conduct - some sort of "plus" - is needed, Butts and Henry together
indicate that that "plus" need not be much. And Butts makes clear
that officers who err do so at their personal peril.
C.

Dickerson v. United States

The tale is by now familiar.
In 1968, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, a provision of which sought to replace Miranda in federal
prosecutions. Under that provision, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a
voluntary confession "shall be admitted."63 The statute also provides
that the judge shall consider a variety of factors to determine volun
tariness, including whether or not the accused was advised of the right
to remain silent and the right to the assistance of counsel.64 Though
these circumstances are to be taken into consideration, they "need not
be conclusive."65 In this respect, the statute sought to replace Miranda,
which makes its regime of warnings and waiver conclusive, at least as
to the admissibility of a statement in the case-in-chief.
The statute lay fallow for years, for the most part unenforced by
the Department of Justice and ignored by the courts.66 In February
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1995).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b} (1995) provides:
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the
circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing be
tween arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after
arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense
with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confes
sion, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to
make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or
not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of
counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when
questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into considera
tion by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
65. Id.
66. For various accounts of the treatment of the statute, see Paul G. Cassell, The Statute
That Time Forgot: 18 U. S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175,
197-225 (1999); Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 883, 925-28 (2000); Michael Edmund O'Neill, Undoing Miranda, 2000 BYU L. REV.
185, 233-50.
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1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit accepted the
invitation of Professor Paul Cassell and the Washington Legal
Foundation to resurrect the law in an interlocutory appeal from an or
der suppressing evidence. The court held that § 3501 was constitu
tional, and that Charles Dickerson's statement should be admitted
into evidence because it was voluntary.6 7 The Supreme Court reversed.
On June 26, 2000, in Dickerson v. United States,68 the Supreme
Court held by a 7-2 vote "that Miranda, being a constitutional decision
of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of
Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves."69 Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the lower court's reli
ance upon the fact that the Supreme Court had created several excep
tions to Miranda's warnings requirement and that the Court had "re
peatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as 'prophylactic,' . . . and
'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.' " 70
Conceding "that there is some language in some of our opinions that
supports the view," the justices disagreed with the court of appeals'
conclusion that Miranda's protections are not constitutionally re
quired. 71 Addressing the "public safety" and impeachment exceptions
described in New York v. Quarles72 and Harris v. New York, the ma
jority claimed that "[t]hese decisions illustrate the principle - not that
Miranda is not a constitutional rule - but that no constitutional rule is
immutable." 73 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented,
tearing at the majority for "its carefully couched iterations that
'Miranda is a constitutional decision,' that 'Miranda is constitutionally
based,' [and] that Miranda has 'constitutional underpinnings.' " 74 Ac
cording to Justice Scalia, the Court fell short of stating that an un
warned custodial interrogation violates the Constitution "because a
majority of the Court does not believe it," perhaps suggesting that the
majority was disingenuous in its internal reasoning. 75 He accused the
Court of engaging in extraconstitutional "power-judging. " 76

67. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
68. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
69. Id. at 2329.
70. Id. at 2333 (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1 984), and Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)) (footnote omitted).
71. Id.
72. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
73. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335.
74. Id. at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
75. Id; see also id. at 2343 (asserting that the Court did not address the claim that
Miranda establishes a constitutional prophylactic rule "because, I assume, a majority of the
Justices intent on reversing believes that incoherence is the lesser evil").
76. Id. at 2337.
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The dissenters have something of a point: The majority could have
held that a violation of Miranda is a per se violation of the Fifth
Amendment. But such a ruling would have required the Court to deal
more directly with the impeachment and public safety exception cases,
which are premised at least in part on the notion that a Miranda viola
tion is not a core constitutional violation. The majority also attempted
to distinguish Oregon v. Elstad,77 which refused to exclude the testi
monial fruit of a Miranda violation, claiming that "[o]ur decision in
that case . . . does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional deci
sion, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under
the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation
under the Fifth Amendment."78This is fairly unsatisfying, inasmuch as
the fruits doctrine applies to other types of Fifth Amendment trans
gressions79 and probably to Fourteenth Amendment violations as
well;80 moreover, the majority in Elstad said that Miranda's exclusion
ary rule "may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment
violation."81 Further, the Court has created a weaker rule of exclusion
for statements taken in violation of Miranda than for other types of
compelled testimony and for statements that violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.82 For that reason, concluding that breaches of Miranda
77. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
78. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335.
79. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) ("(I]mmunity from use and
derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and
therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of privilege.") (emphasis added).
I am not alone in criticizing the Court's clumsy handling of Elstad. See Paul G. Cassell,
The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's Failures in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 901
(2001); Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors,
and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1 030, 1073
(2001); see also Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation,
2000 SUP. er. REV. 61, 80 n.79. Some courts also have had difficulty determining whether
Dickerson undermines the holding in Elstad. Compare State v. Walton, No. Wl998-00329SC-Rll-CD, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 222, at *37 (Tenn. Mar. 15, 2001) (holding that Dickerson
did not overrule Elstad), with People v. Trujillo, No. 98CA2575, 2000 Colo. App. LEXIS
2213, at *5-6 (Colo. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2000) (ruling that Dickerson distinguished Elstad, and
applying the "fruits" doctrine to bar impeachment of defense witnesses).
80. The Supreme Court has apparently never directly faced the question whether the
fruits of an involuntary statement must be excluded, though it has come close. In Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978), the Court declared that "any criminal trial use against a
defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law." In A rizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 300 (1991), the Court found that the use of an involuntary state
ment harmed the defendant for several reasons, including that it made other highly
damaging evidence relevant and, thus, admissible. For a discussion of the reasons why the
fruits doctrine should apply to Fourteenth Amendment violations, see Yale Kamisar, On the
"Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 929 (1995).
81. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306.
82. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978). Portash distinguishes Harris and holds that testimony given under a grant of immu
nity cannot be used for impeachment, because - unlike statements obtained in violation of
testimony obtained under an order of immunity is truly compelled. See
Miranda
-
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are per se Fifth Amendment violations would eventually force the
Court to choose among three alternatives: (1) enhance the Miranda
exclusionary rule, (2) adopt different exclusionary rules for different
types of Fifth Amendment violations, or (3) retreat from earlier hold
ings that equate Fifth Amendment compulsion with Fourteenth
Amendment coercion.83 These must have appeared unhappy choices
for the Dickerson majority, which also sought to rest its ruling on prin
ciples of stare decisis.84
Even so, Dickerson should put to rest the claim that Miranda's
procedures are merely nonconstitutional suggested guidelines, as
hinted in Tucker and as a number of law enforcement instructors have
told police. "Congress," the Court held, may "set aside any judicially
created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the
Constitution."85 That Congress lacked such authority in this case can
mean only that Miranda's procedures are indeed required by the
Constitution. Further, "[t]he Miranda opinion itself begins by stating
that the Court granted certiorari 'to explore some facets of the prob
lems . . . of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in
custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for
law enforcement agencies and courts to follow . ' "86 "Concrete constitu
tional guidelines" are more than mere non-constitutional suggestions.
Dickerson's message to law enforcement is that Miranda's rules are
here to stay.

Portash, 440 U.S. at 458-59. Similarly, Mincey distinguishes Harris and Hass and holds that
the impeachment use of an involuntary statement is a denial of due process. See Mincey, 437

U.S. at 398.
83. If Miranda violations are per se violations of the Fifth Amendment, the Court would
have to abandon the Harris/Hass impeachment exception, overturn Portash, or find some
other reason for the different outcomes. Likewise, the Court would eventually have to rec
oncile Tucker and Elstad with Kastigar, and decide whether the "fruits" doctrine applies to
Fifth Amendment/Miranda violations as well as to Fifth Amendment/immunity grants. At
least one justice has suggested that there is a permissible distinction between the use of
"fruits" in these two situations. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660, 669-672 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court might also seek to re
view its earlier rulings equating Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, as some have
suggested. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 44045 (1987). Yet even if such a review led to different rules of exclusion for Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment violations, the Court would still have to reconcile Harris and Hass
with Portash.
84. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000).
85. Id. at 2332.
86. Id. at 2333-34 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966) (emphasis
added in Dickerson)).
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To assess whether these recent decisions - especially Dickerson
- may influence police practices in California, I examined on-the-job
("in-service") law enforcement training materials. Most police officers
are not lawyers and they do not usually read legal newspapers; thus,
judicial opinions will not have an impact in the stationhouse unless
sworn personnel are formally instructed about them. Supporting this
view, two studies of police and the Fourth Amendment report that in
service training makes the most significant contribution to officers'
understanding of search and seizure law.87 Of course, knowledge is not
the same as practice. Training materials will not alter police behavior
in the stationhouse unless officers decide to follow them.88 Training is
thus necessary though not sufficient to alter law enforcement behav
ior.
In late August 2000, I sent formal requests to forty-five law en
forcement offices around the state, seeking their training materials on
Peevy, Henry, Butts and Dickerson, as well as materials concerning the
practice of questioning "outside Miranda. "89 The requests, made pur87. See William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 311, 337-38 (1991) (developing regression model based upon answers to surveys of
officers, and finding that extensive in-service training provided the most substantial explana
tion for officers' understanding of Fourth Amendment law; other dependent variables in the
model included college attendance, assignment as supervisor or plain clothes investigator,
years of service, number of recent arrests, number of recent suppression hearings, and expo
sure to law suits); L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the
Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 730-32 (1998) (surveying officers and reporting
that those with continuing training answered 52.6% of search and seizure hypotheticals cor
rectly, while those without such training answered 35% correctly; educational background,
rank and experience did not necessarily affect performance); see also Corey Fleming
Hirokawa, Note, Making the "Law of the Land" the Law on the Street: How Police
A cademies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 295, 330-31 (2000)
(finding, in a study of Atlanta-area law enforcement agencies, that the complexity of search
and seizure law does not appear to have led departments to decrease their efforts to teach
procedures that comply with the Fourth Amendment). But see Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deter

rence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts,

63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 91-92 (1992) (reporting that, in survey of judges, prosecutors and
defense lawyers, 51 % of respondents believe that the experience of having evidence sup
pressed is at least as effective as teaching officers the law).
88. Heffernan and Lovely also report that, in approximately 15% of the responses, offi
cers indicated their willingness to search a suspect or a dwelling in deliberate violation of the
Fourth Amendment. See Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 87, at 346-55. In-service training
affected the officers' knowledge of the law, but not their willingness to comply with it. See id.
at 354-55.
For a fuller discussion of this point, see infra Section III.A.
89. Appendix A to this Article contains a sample request to a police department. For
the most part, the same request was sent to each agency, with slight wording changes for dis
trict attorney and sheriff's offices.
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suant to the California Public Records Act,90 went to the
Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, the District At
torneys and Sheriffs9 1 in fourteen counties, and the Chiefs of
Police in sixteen large cities.92 I included District Attorneys because
police often learn about the law from individual prosecutors, even if
Deputy District Attorneys and their investigators do not themselves
conduct many custodial interrogations. I collected instructional mate
rials from POST, the Attorney General's Office, and statewide organi
zations. I received responses from ten District Attorneys (71 % re
sponse), nine Sheriffs (64 % response), and ten local police
departments (62.5% response).93
Section B, infra, describes the training materials issued by POST
and other statewide entities. I believe that I have obtained a fairly
comprehensive set of materials distributed by state agencies and
statewide organizations, and can therefore safely draw conclusions
about the effect of Dickerson and other cases upon statewide training.
The materials collected from local agencies are less comprehensive.
Section C, infra, describes instruction in select counties and cities.
B.
1.

Statewide Training

Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training

The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
("POST"), part of the California Department of Justice, is the most
active statewide training body for police officers and deputy sheriffs.
POST approves standard curricula for new officer instruction, and cer
tifies in-service or advanced officer training. POST also conducts a
monthly satellite video broadcast with case law updates, and the
broadcast is downloaded by law enforcement agencies across the
state.94

90. CAL.

GOV'T

CODE §§ 6250-6268 (1995 & Supp. 2001).

91. Felonies are generally prosecuted by the county district attorneys' offices. See CAL.
CODE § 26500 (1988 & Supp. 2001). The Sheriffs departments are county-wide law
enforcement agencies. District attorneys and sheriffs are elected in each county. See CAL.
Gov'T CODE §§ 24000, 24009(a) (1988 & Supp. 2001). Most cities in California have their
own police departments, each headed by an appointed chief, though some incorporated and
all unincorporated areas rely upon the county sheriff for local law enforcement. See CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 36501, 36505 (1988 & Supp. 2001).
Gov'T

92. Appendix B to this Article lists the counties and cities that I surveyed and notes
which agencies responded to the Public Records Act requests.
93. See infra Appendix B .
94. The monthly broadcast, formerly titled Case Law Updates, i s now called Case Law
Today. Each broadcast contains a series of short topics. For a list of broadcasts and topics,
see Case Law Today Broadcasts at http://www.post.ca.gov/cptn/casebrod.htm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2001).
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It is difficult to overemphasize the impact of POST. Even if many
officers in an agency do not see the POST materials directly, they are
usually trained by people who do. Moreover, most detectives and in
vestigators - who ordinarily conduct the custodial interrogations in
serious cases - have received advanced interrogation training in
POST-approved courses.95 Many of these courses are provided by
trainers outside of the officers' own departments, who may be unfa
miliar with local policies and practices. Thus, even if a local law en
forcement agency has a policy of strict compliance with Miranda, de
tectives and other investigators may receive advanced instruction from
people operating under a different set of guidelines.
POST's monthly satellite broadcasts have addressed the recent
Miranda cases. POST's July 1998 broadcast included a segment on the
impeachment exception and Peevy.96 The segment reviews Harris,
Hass, and Branscombe (the depublished decision)97 before turning to
Peevy. The trainer, a deputy district attorney, reports that a statement
"is perfectly admissible even though the police officer deliberately
took it for purposes of impeachment." He then warns that it cannot be
used for any purpose if it is rendered involuntary by the interrogator
"assuring the person that it will be off the record and cannot be used
against them in court. "98 He adds:
Another caution. You see sometimes the newscasters giving you the
news and then they want to give you their opinion about that. They want
to add something that's not the facts, it's just their commentary. And so
down at the bottom of the screen it says, opinion or commentary. When
a court does that they call it dicta. They've got their ruling, which might
be the news, and then they've got their commentary, which is called
dicta. It means this is not binding on anybody. This is not a statement of
the law. This is just us expressing our personal opinions about something.
In Parts B and C of their opinion in Peevy, the California Supreme Court
expressed its displeasure with the tactic of questioning outside Miranda
in order to obtain an impeachment statement. They made it very clear
95. According to a POST analyst, over 7,000 POST-approved training courses are of
fered each year. See Letter from Anna de! Porto, Associate Analyst, ·POST (Oct. 11, 2000)
(on file with author). A recent catalog of POST-approved courses runs 263 pages. See
COMM'N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING, POST CATALOG OF CERTIFIED
COURSES (Sept. 2000). It lists 17 advanced courses on interrogation and interviews from
POST-approved providers (see id. at 174-76), though many other advanced courses also deal
with interrogation. The current catalog may be viewed at http://www.post.ca.gov-/catalog/
intro.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2001).
96. See Videotape: Case Law Updates: Questioning "Outside Miranda" for
Impeachment (Golden West College) (POST July 9, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Videotape 1].
97. Branscombe was depublished on June 24, 1998, see supra note 41, two weeks before
the videotape was broadcast. The videotape segment is undated, and may have been pro
duced prior to the order depublishing the decision.
98. Videotape 1, supra note 96.
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they don't approve of it. They thought in their opinion that it was illegal,
they said. That's the word that they used, though they were unable to cite
to a U.S. Supreme Court case, since there isn't one, saying that it's ille
gal. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently said this is an evidentiary
rule that will limit use of the statement in court. They have never said it
is illegal to question without Miranda compliance. Nor, I will bet my
money, will they ever. But the California Supreme Court in its commen
tary, in its dicta said, this is illegal, it's improper.
So before you decide whether or not you want to go outside Miranda and
take an impeachment statement that will be admissible if it's otherwise
voluntary, you may want to do what we always caution you to do, seek
advice from your departmental legal adviser, local prosecutor, city attor
ney or county counsel, whoever you turn to for advice. I commend you to
their advice. As to the admissibility of the evidence, a statement deliber
ately taken outside Miranda, if it's otherwise voluntary, is admissible for
impeachment, People v. Peevy. You're up-to-date as of now.99

POST broadcast another segment after the Fourth Circuit's ruling
in Dickerson.100 The trainer emphasizes that Miranda establishes a
prophylactic rule, not rights protected by the Constitution, and that if
Miranda can be preempted by a statute in the federal courts, "it could
be done state by state by state."101
After the ruling in Henry v. Kernan, POST broadcast a segment
warning officers about tactics that may lead to an involuntary state
ment.102 In this segment, the trainer, a different prosecutor than that
featured in the two other broadcasts, underscores that repeated
Miranda violations may amount to badgering and may prevent a
statement from being used for any purpose. In contrast to the earlier
broadcasts, he expressly tells officers not to question in violation of
Miranda: "It isn't worth it. It isn't worth your reputation or the reputa
tion of your department - much less the potential civil rights liability
under 42 U.S. Code 1983
to willfully violate Miranda. "103
Yet another broadcast was issued after the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Butts, featuring the same deputy district attorney who appeared in
the videos on Peevy and Dickerson.104 He instructs that a Fifth
-

99. Id.
100. See Videotape: Case Law Updates: Miranda: Beginning to Crumble? (Golden West
College) (POST May 6, 1999) (on file with author).
101. Id. He adds that " [T)his could be the beginning of the end of Miranda. I don't want
to be too optimistic. . . . But the Fourth Circuit says we are on our way on that mission." Id.
102. See Videotape: Case Law Today: Miranda: Ignoring Invocation by Upset Subject
Collapses Case (Alameda County Dist. Attorney's Office) (POST Aug. 5, 1999) (on file with
author).
103. Id.
104. See Videotape: Case Law Today: Civil Liability "Outside Miranda?" Cal. A tt'ys for
Crim. Justice v. Butts (Golden West College) (POST Jan. 13, 2000) (on file with author).
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Amendment violation can occur only at trial, and that a bare Miranda
violation is not enough to establish civil rights liability under § 1983.
He emphasizes that Butts involved allegations of coercive techniques
in addition to questioning "outside Miranda," and that is why the offi
cers might be subject to civil rights liability.105 The trainer adds:
In

Oregon v. Elstad,

the U.S. Supreme Court said, point blank, a
violation does not constitute coercion. So how could the Ninth
Circuit or anybody else ever come along and say, hmmm, that's enough
by itself? They couldn't, they haven't - no matter what you have seen in
the press. No matter what you might hear from people who are running
around wetting their pants over this thing and saying, oh, the sky is fal
ling, if we have any kind of non-compliance with Miranda we're going to
get sued, they are oversimplifying, they are over-reading this case. This
case says coercive tactics, which you should never use under any circum
stances anyway, combined with questioning outside Miranda, could
mean you have to stand trial. Doesn't mean you're liable. Could mean
you have to stand trial. You don't get out on summary judgment motion.
You don't get out on qualified immunity. Procedural issue.
But all of these cases have said, from the U.S. Supreme Court and even
from the Ninth Circuit, they have said, there is no cause of action, there
is no constitutional violation where all police are alleged to have done is
continue to question somebody after a Miranda invocation. 1 06

Miranda

As of March 2001, POST has not broadcast a segment on the
Supreme Court's ruling in Dickerson.107
As noted, POST also certifies law enforcement training pro
grams.108 In the wake of Dickerson, POST's executive director issued a
memorandum to all "POST Certified Training Presenters," empha
sizing respect for Miranda and stating that POST's policy is that no of
ficer shall continue to interrogate a suspect over a Miranda invoca
tion.109 The director's message, however, was undone by a sentence in
the last part of his memorandum: "Procedures related to the 'im
peachment' exception are a matter of local policy and are referred to
each independent agency for clarification."110 It is difficult to predict
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See POST Case Law Today Broadcasts, available at http://www.post.-ca.gov/cptn/
casebrod.htm.
108. See CAL.

PENAL CODE

§§ 13510.1, 1351 1.3, 13519.9 (2000).

109. Memorandum from Kenneth J. O'Brien, Executive Director, Commission on Peace
Officer Standards and Training to POST Certified Training Presenters 1 (Aug. 14, 2000) (on
file with author).
110. Id. The memorandum provides:
Recently the United States Supreme Court ruled that Miranda procedures were a "constitu
tional rule" and that Congress could not supersede the safeguards established by the court
decision legislatively. The Court preserved the defendant's Fifth Amendment protections es-
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how the hundreds of POST-certified trainers will instruct officers in
light of this memorandum.
2.

California A ttorney General's Office

The California Department of Justice publishes the California
("the Sourcebook"), which is widely
used by prosecutors and police, including many law enforcement
trainers. Portions of the Sourcebook were provided by a number of
departments that responded to the request for training materials. The
Sourcebook contains a section titled "Deliberately Ignoring an Invoca
tion," which has been substantially revised in the wake of Peevy, Butts
and Dickerson.
Prior to the Peevy decision, the Sourcebook opined that a volun
tary "outside Miranda" statement should be admissible for impeach
ment, noting that "the Miranda decision is not a code of conduct set
ting forth how police must conduct their investigations in the field."111
After Peevy, the section was revised to explain that the California
Supreme Court held that evidence taken in deliberate violation of
Miranda could be used for impeachment.112 The Sourcebook also ref
erences the part of the decision that calls such tactics "illegal," but
questions this holding and characterizes it as dicta.113 This section of
the Sourcebook concludes that " [i]t may take a decision from the
United States Supreme Court to finally settle this question and resolve
the apparent conflict between the dicta in Peevy and federal law."114
Another portion of the Sourcebook emphasizes that "nothing in the

Peace Officers Legal Sourcebook

tablished in Miranda. Certified POST curriculum has always included a "respect" for the
protections established in the Miranda decision and a prohibition against illegal or improper
misconduct. As a result of the recent reaffirmation of the rights established in the Miranda
decision, the following points need to be repeated as the Commission's policy:
• No officer shall intentionally violate Miranda by continuing to interrogate a suspect af
ter they have invoked their right to counsel or to remain silent.
• No officer shall engage in any conduct that can be concluded to be "coercive" including
making false promises following the invocation of Miranda rights.
Procedures related to the "impeachment" exception are a matter of local policy and are re
ferred to each independent agency for clarification. The POST Commission is committed to
compliance with the "spirit" as well as the letter of the Supreme Court's ruling.

Id.
1 1 1 . SOURCEBOOK , supra note 21,

§ 7.40a-b

(Rev. Mar. 1997).

1 12. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, § 7.40a (Rev. July 1998) (on file with author)
(noting that an "outside Miranda" statement "may be used to impeach the defendant re
gardless whether the police non-compliance with Miranda's procedures was negligent (acci
dental) or intentional" ) ; id. § 7.48b ("[I]f you fail to comply with the Miranda guidelines in a
non-coercive way, although any statement you obtain will be inadmissible at trial to prove
guilt (i.e., in the prosecution's 'case-in-chief), that is the only 'penalty.' The statement will
be admissible in rebuttal to impeach . . . ; you can also use the statement for any other pur
pose.") (citations omitted).
1 13. See id.
1 14. Id.

§ 7.40b.
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decision is constitutionally required," noting that "if you fail
to comply with the Miranda guidelines in a non-coercive way, although
any statement you obtain will be inadmissible at trial to prove guilt
(i.e., in the prosecution's 'case-in-chief'), that is the only 'penalty.' "115
Following the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Henry and Butts, the
Attorney General's Office began to hedge. The Sourcebook notes that
there were coercive aspects to the questioning in those cases but that
Henry could also be read to hold that a deliberate violation of
Miranda is itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment.116 Further, the
Sourcebook remarks that:
Miranda

[R)eview by the United States Supreme Court will be sought in both
and Butts. In the meantime, however, it is understandable that
many departments in this state have instructed their officers to strictly
comply with Miranda's procedures, at least pending further develop
ments, not the least of which will be the high court's upcoming decision
in the Dickerson case. 1 1 7
Henry

The ruling in Dickerson and the denials of certiorari
B utts led the Attorney General's Office to change its
Sourcebook was revised to read:

in Henry and
training. The

[A] deliberate or intentional violation of Miranda is an extremely risky
tactic in California at this time, not so much because of Dickerson, but
rather because of the Ninth Circuit, which has ruled that a deliberate
Miranda violation, in combination with almost any other or additional
conduct which the court also views as "coercive," will:
render any subsequently obtained statement "coerced," "involun
tary'' and therefore inadmissible for any purpose, including impeach
ment; and
- entitle the suspect to sue for a civil rights violation under the Fifth
Amendment for which the offending officer(s) can be found personally
liable! 1 18
'_

Thus, "the 'bottom line' now must be: do not intentionally violate
Miranda, in particular, do not ignore an invocation of the right to si
lence or counsel. This is because an intentional violation will virtually
guarantee a civil rights lawsuit against you and your depart
ment. . . . "119 Further, following Dickerson, the Sourcebook also
stepped away from its earlier teaching that nothing in Miranda is con
stitutionally required, noting that "a majority of Justices characterized
1 15. Id. § 7.48b.
1 16.

SOURCEBOOK, supra

note 21, § 7.40b (Rev. Jan. 2000).

1 17. Id. § 7.40c.
1 18.

SOURCEBOOK, supra

note 21, § 7.40c (Rev. Sept. 2000) (emphasis in original).

1 1 9. Id. § 7.40d (emphasis in original); see also id. § 7.86 (stating that even a noncoercive
Miranda violation may result in civil rights liability where it is intentional and done in com
bination with some other conduct).
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[Miranda's] 'prophylactic' procedures as being 'constitutionally based'
and therefore amounting to a 'constitutional rule' (although still
clearly not part of the Constitution itself)."120
3.

Statewide Organizations

The California District Attorneys Association ("CDAA'') pub
lishes a monthly training bulletin, Did You Kno w . . . , with occasional
articles about Miranda. Prior to Peevy, at least one article encouraged
officers to question "outside Miranda," noting that "since Miranda is
not of constitutional dimension, officers risk no civil liability. . . . Instead, they have 'little to lose and perhaps something to gain. . . .' "121
After Peevy, Henry and Butts, the bulletin took the opposite tack,
printing an article that states that Henry and Butts have blurred the
distinction between a Miranda violation and Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment violations, and cautioning that "[w]e must remember that
courts are uniformly critical of intentional Miranda violations as a law
enforcement tactic and that we, as officers of the court, should not be
encouraging this practice."122 Following Dickerson, the bulletin has
emphasized that Miranda is a constitutional rule, noting,
Except for the increased likelihood of officers being held civilly liable for
intentional violations of the Miranda rule - a practice we as prosecutors
should be discouraging anyway
Dickerson v. United States does not
really do much more than dash the hopes of all those who thought
Miranda might just go away. Otherwise, courtesy of the Supreme Court,
plan on business as usual for the unforeseeable future.1 23
-

In addition, the CDAA also publishes a treatise on Miranda that is
widely distributed to prosecutors.124 The treatise contains a compre
hensive and straightforward summary of the relevant law, describing
the impeachment exception but also the full ruling in Peevy and the

120. Id. § 7.48a.
121. Devallis Rutledge, Questioning "Outside Miranda," in DID You KNOW . . . 1995,
at 4 (Cal. Dist. Attorney's Ass'n, DID You KNOW . . . Series, June 1995) (on file with author)
(quoting Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1244 (9th Cir. 1992), and Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 723 (1975)).
122. Robert C. Phillips, Miranda and the Constitution, in DID You KNOW . . . 2000, at 2
(Cal. Dist. Attorney's Ass'n, DID You KNOW . . . Series, Feb. 2000) (on file with author); see
also Robert C. Phillips, After a Miranda Invocation: The Interrogator's Options, in D I D You
KNOW . . . 2001 , at 1 (Cal. Dist. Attorney's Ass'n, DID You KNOW . . . Series, Jan. 2001) (on
file with author) (describing other circumstances in which police may permissibly reinitiate
interrogation after an invocation, and stating that prosecutors "probably have a professional,
if not ethical, duty to discourage law enforcement" from questioning "outside Miranda").
123. Robert C. Phillips, Miranda Lives, in DID You KNOW . . . 2000, at 3 (California
Dist. Attorney's Ass'n, DID You KNOW . . . Series, July 2000) (on file with author).
124. ROBERT C. PHILLIPS, MIRANDA AND THE LAW (1999).
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circumstances that may lead courts to rule that statements are involun
tary and inadmissible for all purposes.125
The California Peace Officers' Association regularly distributes
training bulletins that are collected from agencies throughout
California. In August 2000, the Association distributed a bulletin not
ing that up until the Fall of 1999, officers in California had been in
structed that it was appropriate in some cases to question over a
Miranda invocation.126 The bulletin reviews the Butts and Dickerson
decisions and states:
On June 26, 2000, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the re
quirement of Miranda and refused to review the "Butts" case . . . .
Despite good faith differences of opinion, the issue is now settled; police
are not permitted to continue questioning suspects who invoke their
Fifth Amendment Rights without facing potential personal liability, as
well as the inadmissibility of any statements which might be elicited
thereafter. . . .
It is now, more than ever, imperative that officers be aware of the United
States Supreme Court ruling and know that Miranda Warnings shall be
given to custodial suspects prior to interrogation and all questioning shall
cease when Miranda Rights are invoked in any fashion, and at any time
prior to or during the interrogation. 1 27

C.
1.

L ocal Training

District A ttorneys ' Offices

The county district attorneys' offices vary greatly in their Miranda
training. For example, in the wake of the California Supreme Court's
ruling in Peevy, the Los Angeles District Attorney's office issued a di
rective to all prosecutors and investigators, stating: "It is the policy of
this office that deputy district attorneys shall not advise any law en
forcement officer to continue to ask questions for the purpose of ob
taining "impeachment" evidence after a suspect has invoked his
Miranda rights."128 By contrast, a bulletin prepared by a leading
trainer in the Orange County District Attorney's Office reports that
statements taken in deliberate violation of Miranda are admissible for

125. See id. at 144-48, 163-68.
126. See CAL. PEACE OFFICERS'

ASS'N, TRAINING BULL. SERV., MIRANDA UPDATE 
QUESTIONING "OUTSIDE" MIRANDA 1 (Aug. 2000) (on file with author). "Fall of 1999"

most likely refers to the ruling in Butts.
127. Id. (emphases in original).
128. Special Directive 98-02 from Robert P. Heflin, Chief Deputy District Attorney, to
All Deputy District Attorneys and All District Attorney Investigators 1 (June 18, 1998) (on
file with author) (original language in bold).
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impeachment.129 The author opines that the result should be the same
even if there were to be a proven policy of non-compliance with
MirandaY0 Obliquely referring to the portion of the Peevy opinion
that calls such tactics "illegal" and "misconduct," the newsletter con
cludes:
In what a constitutional scholar from the Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation has charitably described as "unfortunate dictum," the Peevy
court delivered itself of some additional statements of its understanding
of the nature of Miranda . . . that will be open to serious dispute if they
should ever form the basis of a ruling. Meanwhile, like they say down
home, "If you've caught the fish, don't fret about losing the bait."1 31

The training materials produced by the different county prosecu
tors are not easily categorized. The responses to the Public Records
Act requests leave the overall impression that many county prosecu
tors have been quicker and more certain than their statewide counter
parts in cautioning against questioning "outside Miranda," but instruc
tion is not uniform among counties and, indeed, may not be consistent
even within a single given county.
Two counties, Alameda and San Diego, have promulgated par
ticularly extensive training materials, which appear to be widely dis
tributed both inside and outside of those counties. It is worth describ
ing their training documents in detail.
a. A lameda County. 132 The Alameda County District Attorney's
Office produces several sets of in-house training materials. It publishes
written case updates four times a year, called Point of View. It has
also, until recently, produced videotapes with case updates, also called
Point of View. 133 In addition, the Office publishes a manual, California
Criminal Investigation.
The written Point of View series has occasionally discussed ques
tioning following a Miranda invocation. A 1993 article addresses the
admissibility of statements taken in violation of Miranda, but does not

encourage such questioning. 134 Later, the California Supreme Court's
1 29. See ORANGE COUNTY DIST. ATTORNEY, GOOD TO KNOW . . ., IMPEACHMENT
WITH POST-INVOCATION STATEMENTS 1-2 (May 1998) (on file with author). The same

trainer appeared in the POST videotapes following the Peevy and Butts decisions.
130. See id.
131. Id.

at 2.

(original in brackets).

132. Alameda is a large, urban county in northern California that includes the City of
Oakland. The population of Alameda County and Oakland as of April 2000 are 1,443,741
and 399,484, respectively. The population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau and are
available at http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Apr. 20, 2001).
133. The videotapes are distributed to police agencies; Alameda County prosecutors do
not watch them. E-mail from William M. Baldwin, Assistant District Attorney to
Charles D. Weisselberg (Aug. 28, 2000) (on file with author).
134. See ALAMEDA COUNTY DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, POINT OF VIEW, The Law of
Police Interrogation; Miranda: Part Two, at 15-16 (Spring 1993) [hereinafter POINT OF VIEW]
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ruling in Peevy was summarized in Point of View, emphasizing the
connection between Miranda violations and involuntariness and not
ing that statements may be excluded for all purposes if taken pursuant
to a policy of intentionally violating Miranda, but not discussing the
portion of the decision that labels questioning "outside Miranda" "il
legal" and "misconduct."135 After the Ninth Circuit ruled in Henry v.
Kernan, an article again stresses that "outside Miranda" questioning
may make a statement involuntary.136 Following the ruling in Butts,
Point of View extensively discusses the case and concludes: "In light of
this decision and others that have preceded it, there is only one thing
to say about 'going outside Miranda': DON'T."137 Most recently, ac
cording to the District Attorney's Office, "Dickerson should put an
end . . . " to questioning "outside Miranda" because the ruling rejects
the claim "that Miranda was nothing more than a 'recommended pro
cedure,' and was not a Constitutional requirement."138
The Point of View videotapes, which are distributed to law en
forcement agencies within the county, appear more receptive to the
tactic of questioning "outside Miranda,'' at least up until the time of
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Butts. A videotape on Peevy tells offi
cers that a statement taken in deliberate violation of Miranda is ad
missible for impeachment, but does not describe Peevy's condemna
tion of such questioning.139 Another videotape describes the holding in
Branscombe, a case that was depublished two months before the video
was produced.140 That videotape mildly encourages officers to question
over a Miranda invocation, noting that even if a statement will have
only a limited use at trial, it "puts us in a better position" because

(on file with author).
135. See POINT OF VIEW, supra note 134, People v. Bey, at 22 (Spring 1994) (on file with
author) ("It should come as no surprise that the courts are not going to sit by and watch as
officers conduct custodial interrogations 'outside Miranda' . . . . We had hoped this issue had
been put to rest in 1991 when the Court of Appeal published its decision in [another "out
side Miranda" case]."); see also POINT OF VIEW, supra note 134, People v. Peevy, at 16
(Summer 1998) (on file with author) (indicating disapproval of the practice).
136. See POINT OF VIEW, supra note 134, Henry v. Kernan, at 31-32 (Summer 1999) (on
file with author). The article ends with this noncommittal comment: "Eventually, the legality
of 'going outside Miranda' will have to be decided by the United States Supreme Court. The
sooner, the better." Id. at 32.
137. See POINT OF VIEW, supra note 134, McNally v. Butts et al. [sic], at 21 (Winter
2000) (on file with author).
138. Dickerson v. United States, POINT OF VIEW ONLINE, available at http://www .co.
alameda.ca.us/da/pov/dickerson_2.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2001).
139. Videotape: Point of View: Evading Miranda; Peevy (Alameda County Dist.
Attorney's Office, July 7, 1998) (on file with author). The trainer points out that Miranda is
not a constitutional rule, but officers should not throw away their Miranda cards. Id.
140. See Videotape: Point of View: Investigation: Beyond Miranda (Alameda County
Dist. Attorney's Office, Aug. 24, 1998) (on file with author).
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"[w]e can use it to impeach, which means to disrupt their case."141
Following the ruling in Henry v. Kernan, another videotape tells offi
cers that "[y]ou can get stuff to impeach and it is admissible" if volun
tary.142 But, the trainer warns, "[D]on't push it. We're being given a lit
tle bit of leeway here."143 The instruction after Butts is markedly
different. A new trainer notes that he has seen written manuals that
"have told officers that it's perfectly all right to ignore an unambigu
ous Miranda invocation" and "it's hard to understand with the courts
coming down as they have on these cases why it's still going on."144 He
tells police, unambiguously, that "[a]s far as outside Miranda goes,
don't do it."145
The Alameda County District Attorney's Office investigation
manual, California Criminal Investigation, expressly instructs that once
a custodial suspect invokes his right to silence or his right to counsel,
officers must terminate the interrogation.146 Following the decision in
Dickerson, the manual was revised to state that questioning "outside
Miranda" is "[p]robably illegal,'' and that Dickerson has rejected the
theory that underlies the practice.147 The manual also now cites Butts
and notes that officers who question "outside Miranda" may be
sued.148
b. San Diego County. 149 The CDAA treatise, authored by a San
Diego deputy district attorney,150 is the main reference for prosecutors
in the office.151 More recent training for prosecutors reviews Butts,
141. Id. Further, "if the defendant takes the stand, we may then take these statements
obtained by going beyond Miranda, not as a result of coercion, but simply going beyond the
original Miranda concept that we all had and we're now learning is wrong, to keep him from
getting away with perjury." Id.
142. Videotape: Point of View: The Limits of "Beyond Miranda; Henry v. Kernman [sic)
(Alameda County Dist. Attorney's Office, June 15, 1999) (on file with author).
143. Id.
144. See Videotape: Point of View: Beyond Miranda Back in Court (Alameda County
Dist. Attorney's Office, Dec. 6, 1999) (on file with author).
1 45. Id.
146. See

ALAMEDA COUNTY DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATION

197 (2000) (on file with author).

ALAMEDA COUNTY DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION - INTERNET UPDATE, available at http://www.co.alameda.ca.us/da/cci/

147.

-confessions_24.htm (last visited Sept. 2000).
148. Id.
149. San Diego is large county in southern California with both urban and rural areas. It
includes the Cities of San Diego and Oceanside. The populations of San Diego County and
the Cities of San Diego and Oceanside as of April 2000 are 2,813,833, 1,223,400, and 161,029,
respectively. The population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau and are available at
http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Apr. 20, 2001 ).
150. ROBERT C. PHI LLIPS, MIRANDA AND THE LA W (1999).
151. Telephone Conversation with Craig Rooten, Deputy District Attorney, San Diego
County (Sept. 8, 2000).
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and Dickerson at length and states that prosecutors should not
advise officers to violate either the Constitution or the dictates of the
state and federal courts.152 The training outline provides that
Dickerson is a reaffirmation of Miranda, "with the possible exception
of an increased likelihood of civil liability for police officers (and
prosecutors who advise intentional violations). "153
The District Attorney's Office regularly publishes a legal update
for law enforcement agencies within San Diego County.154 The issue
after Peevy reviews the holding, and also acknowledges that the Court
found that officers have an affirmative duty to cease questioning upon
an invocation.155 The update states that "[l]aw enforcement agencies
should not be teaching or encouraging a 'systematic policy' of violat
ing Miranda. "156 The publication tells police about the circuit court
ruling in Dickerson, advising that it has no direct effect here but may
foreshadow change. 157 The publication is critical of the ruling in Henry,
arguing that the court improperly determined that a calculated plan to
violate Miranda violates the Constitution.158 Following Butts, the
District Attorney's Office noted that local law enforcement agencies
are being encouraged by legal advisors to issue a directive not to ques
tion over an invocation. That directive is "overly broad" because offi
cers can question over an invocation where several established excep
tions apply.159 At the same time, the update provides that:
Henry

[U]nless you're working within one of the recognized exceptions to the

Miranda requirement (e.g. "public safety exception" or "rescue doc
trine,'' etc. ) , do not purposely violate Miranda. Although neither the U.S.

nor the California Supreme Court has ever held that an intentional
Miranda violation by itself implicates the Constitution, the U.S.

Supreme Court has told us not to do it and the California Supreme
Court, in Peevy . . . has referred to it as "illegal." And you can bet your
152. See Robert C. Phillips, Miranda: An Update 3-7 (Oct. 9, 2000) (unpublished manu
script, on file with author).
153. Id. at 15.
154. In addition to the office's formal legal updates, some individual prosecutors work
ing with specific law enforcement agencies have distributed their own bulletins. See, e.g. ,
David J. Lattuca, Legal Update 1 (Nov. 1999) (on file with author) (discussing Butts) ; David
J. Lattuca, Legal Update 1-2 (May 1998) (on file with author) (discussing Peevy) .
155. See SAN DIEGO DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, D.A. LIAISON LEGAL UPDATE,
Miranda, at 3 (May 1998), available at http://www.clew.org/legalupdate (last visited Mar. 1,
2001) [hereinafter D.A. LIAISON LEGAL UPDATE].
156. Id. at 4.
157. See D.A. LIAISON LEGAL UPDATE, supra note 155, Case Law: Miranda, at 1-2
(April 1999).
158. See D.A. LIAISON LEGAL UPDATE, supra note 155, Case Law: Miranda, at 5 (Oct.
1999).
159. See D.A. LIAISON LEGAL UPDATE, supra note 155, A dministrative Notes: Miranda
and Civil Liability, at 1 (Nov. 1999).
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boots the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal will somehow torture the facts
to find some way to hold you liable. 160

After the Court decided Dickerson, officers were told that Miranda
imposes a constitutional requirement.1 61 "However," the publication
adds, " . . . contrary to the fears of some, this case does not do much
more than create potential civil liability for intentional Miranda viola
tions; something the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has been trying to
warn us about for some time anyway."1 62
2.

Sheriffs and Police Departments

County sheriffs' offices and city police departments are influenced
by outside training materials. In response to the Public
Records Act requests, many local law enforcement agencies disclosed
or referred to statewide training materials (such as the
Sourcebook or POST videos) as well as bulletins issued by district at
torneys' offices. Training officers sometimes distribute these items di
rectly to police. Sometimes they use them to create their own docu
ments. Thus, even when detectives and patrol officers receive in
service instruction from trainers within their own departments, outside
training materials are quite influential. And many departments send
their officers to outside courses, thereby relinquishing control over the
content of their officers' training.
Because the statewide instruction is not consistent, police depart
ments that make use of these materials may fail to provide clear guid
ance to their officers. As an example, one police department in San
Diego County gives the district attorney's legal updates to officers, but
also requires them to view the POST videos.163 The legal updates are
much more critical of questioning "outside Miranda" than the POST
videos; thus, officers trained with both would not hear a consistent
message.
Moreover, as aiready noted, detectives and investigators routinely
attend advanced programs on interrogation and other topics that are
conducted outside of their respective agencies. These programs may
instruct on tactics that are contrary to the policies of the officers'
home departments. This is illustrated by a broadcast issued by the Los
Angeles County Sheriff to all deputies, pre-dating Peevy, stating,
160. Id. at 3-4.
1 61. See
2000).

D.A.

LIAISON LEGAL UPDATE, supra

note

155, Case Law:

Miranda, at 3 (July

162. Id. at 4.
163. Copies of the updates as well as the POST videos were produced by the Oceanside
Police Department in response to the Public Records Act Request. See also
E-mail from Sgt. Tom Bussey, Oceanside Police Dep't, to Charles D. Weisselberg (Oct. 17,
2000) (on file with author).
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It has come to my attention that training provided by sources outside the
department may have caused some deputies to believe that it is appro
priate to continue to question a suspect in custody following an invoca
tion of his or her rights under Miranda v. A rizona . . . .
[M]embers of this department are expected to give Miranda warnings to
a suspect prior to a custodial interrogation, and are expected to termi
nate that interrogation when a suspect invokes his or her rights.164

As an additional example of an agency's lack of control over out-of
house training, a law firm responding to the Public Records Act re
quest on behalf of the Riverside Sheriff's Department wrote that:
The sources utilized by a law enforcement agency are too numerous to
list or provide, and in most instances, the materials are not the property
of the Riverside Sheriff's Department. In many instances, officers take
classes at P.0.S.T. approved schools, learning from a P.O.S.T. approved
curriculum, and the Department is not in possession of the course mate
rial.16s

A number of county sheriffs and police chiefs have now issued
formal directives, telling their officers not to question "outside
Miranda. " Some of these directives have come at the urging of private
law firms that represent municipalities and are concerned about civil
rights liability.166 The orders from agency heads are different in kind
from in-service training, for they fix the formal policies of the agencies
and - because such directives are issued infrequently - they signal
the importance of their message. Given the inconsistent training on
Miranda in California, sheriffs and police chiefs may issue orders sim
ply to clarify the duty of officers within the agency. In light of the re
cent cases, however, the directives may have at least two other aims.
Peevy left open the argument that statements taken pursuant to a pol
icy to violate Miranda should be suppressed for all purposes.167 Thus,
county sheriffs and city police chiefs may issue directives to attempt to
defeat claims that evidence should be suppressed for all purposes.
And, of course, under Monell v. Department of Social Services,168 mu
nicipalities may be subject to civil rights liability for having a custom

164. Department Broadcast from Sherman Block, Sheriff, Los Angeles County, to All
Personnel 1-2 (Jan. 29, 1998) (on file with author).
165. Letter from Diana L. Field, Ferguson, Praet & Sherman, to Charles D. Weisselberg
2 (Sept. 27, 2000) (on file with author).
166. See, e.g., Client Alert Memorandum from Martin J. Mayer, Mayer & Coble, to All
Police Chiefs and Sheriffs (June 30, 2000) (on file with author); Memorandum from Bruce
D. Praet, Ferguson, Praet & Sherman, to All Chiefs and Sheriffs (June 29, 2000) (on file with
author); Client Alert Memorandum from Paul R. Coble, Mayer & Coble, to All Police
Chiefs and Sheriffs (Nov. 17, 1999) (on file with author).
167. See People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212, 1225-28 (Cal. 1998).
168. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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or policy that deprives individuals of their civil rights. Directives might
be issued to avoid municipal liability.169
Of the twenty sheriffs' and police departments from which I have
obtained materials, 170 eleven have issued formal directives telling offi
cers not to question "outside Miranda. "171 The timing of these direc
tives is revealing. Table 1, below, summarizes the dates of the first
formal order issued by each department in relation to the recent
Miranda decisions. Butts appears to have had the greatest influence
upon the agencies that have decided to issue formal directives, though
in addition to the directives reflected in Table 1, several agencies have
issued orders or specific training bulletins after Dickerson and the de
nial of certiorari in Butts to reconfirm their earlier orders.172
169. For a discussion of the issuance of policies by police departments in the wake of
Monell, see JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 201-05

(1993).

170. Nineteen out of thirty sheriffs' and police departments responded to the Public
Records Act requests. See infra Appendix B. The Los Angeles Police Department did not
respond, but I have obtained materials from that department through other sources.
171 . The sheriffs issuing such directives represent the counties of San Bernardino, see
Interoffice Memorandum from Gary S. Penrod, Sheriff, San Bernardino County, to All
Station/Division Commanders (July 26, 2000) (on file with author); Notice: Interrogations
"Outside" Miranda from Gary S. Penrod to All Personnel (undated) (on file with author);
Shasta, see SHASTA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEP'T, TRAINING B ULL. 2000-04, Miranda Update
(July 2000) (on file with author); Riverside, see Departmental Directive # 00-019 from Larry
D. Smith, Sheriff, Riverside County, to All Personnel (July 5, 2000) (on file with author);
Fresno, see FRESNO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEP'T, ROLL CALL TRAINING BULL., Ninth Circuit
Prohibition of Interrogations "Outside Miranda " (Mar. 29, 2000); and Los Angeles, see
Department Broadcast, supra note 164.
The police chiefs issuing the directives were of the cities of Stockton, see Special Order
No. OO-S-160 from Edward J. Chavez, Chief, Stockton Police Dep't, to All Personnel (Sept.
6, 2000) (on file with author); Redding, see General Order A-53 from Robert P. Blanken
ship, Chief of Police, Redding Police Dep't, to All Personnel (July 31, 2000) (on file with
author); San Jose, see Memorandum from William M. Lansdowne, Chief of Police, San Jose
Police Dep't, to All Sworn Personnel (Dec. 15, 1999) (on file with author); Bakersfield, see
BAKERSFIELD POLICE DEP'T, TRAINING BULL., Ninth Circuit Court Prohibition of
Interrogations "Outside Miranda" (Dec. 1999) (on file with author); Los Angeles, see Notice

3.3.1 from Bernard C. Parks, Chief of Police, Los Angeles Police Dep't, to All Sworn
Personnel (Dec. 2, 1999) (on file with author); and Riverside, see General Order No. 99-15
from Gerald L. Carroll, Chief of Police, Riverside Police Dep't, to All Personnel (Nov. 15,
1999) (on file with author).
I have included the training bulletins from the Fresno and Shasta Sheriffs'
Departments on this list even though they are not, per se, directives from the counties' sher
iffs, but are rather from others within the sheriff's departments. The bulletins are phrased in
sufficiently clear and mandatory language that they would be taken as orders by the sheriffs'
deputies. I have excluded a bulletin from the San Francisco District Attorney to the San
Francisco Police Department, which asks that officers be advised to stop questioning upon
an invocation. See Memorandum from District Attorney Terence Hallinan to Police Legal
Affairs (July 17, 2000) (on file with author). The bulletin was distributed to investigators and
possibly others in the police department, but is not viewed as a directive from the depart
ment itself. Telephone Conversation with Lt. Henry C. Hunter, San Francisco Police Dep't
(Oct. 31, 2000).
172. See, e.g. , Los ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S D EP'T, FIELD OPERATIONS SUPPORT
SERVS., N EWSLETTER No. 156, Miranda Warnings, at 1 (Re-released Sept. 2000) (on file
with author); BAKERSFIELD POLICE DEP'T, TRAINING BULL., Ninth Circuit Court
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TABLE 1: TIMING OF AGENCY D IRECTIVES, INSTRUCTING
OFFICERS NOT TO Q UESTION "OUTSI D E MIRANDA "
1
0
0
7
3
11

Prior to Peevy173
After Peevy
After Henry
After Butts
After Dickerson
Total

The departments that have not issued directives to officers offer a
variety of reasons. Some have provided recent in-service training,174
and may believe that that instruction will suffice. Others indicate that
they have never trained officers to question "outside Miranda" and
thus do not need to issue specific instructions to discontinue the prac
tice.175

Prohibition of Interrogations "Outside Miranda"
Decision Affirmed (July 2000) (on file
with author); Internal Communication from Sgt. Chuck Lebak, City of Redding, to All
Sworn Personnel (July 26, 2000) (on file with author); see also Memorandum from District
Attorney Terence Hallinan to Police Legal Affairs, supra note 171 (characterizing Dickerson
as settling unequivocally whether questioning "outside Miranda" is permissible, and asking
San Francisco Police Department to advise officers not to interrogate over an invocation);
Special Order No. OO-S-160 from Edward J. Chavez, Chief, Stockton Police Dep't, to All
Personnel, supra note 171 (noting that "the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the Miranda de
cision in a Virginia case, and let stand a California case that said officers could be personally
liable for deliberately trampling Miranda rights").
-

173. The Public Records Act requests sought all training bulletins and materials refer
ring to the practice of questioning "outside Miranda," regardless of date. See infra Appendix
A. This should have elicited any orders pre-dating Peevy. Only the Los Angeles County
Sheriff produced any directive telling officers not to question "outside Miranda" prior to the
decision in Peevy, doing so in January, 1998. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
174. E.g. , Telephone Conversation with Lt. Henry C. Hunter, San Francisco Police
Dep't (Oct. 31, 2000) (investigators will shortly be trained on Dickerson); Telephone
Conversation with Lt. Casey Nice, Alameda County Sheriff's Office (Sept. 19, 2000) (depu
ties received roll-call training on Dickerson and have always been trained that questioning
"outside Miranda" is risky); Letter from Carol A. Trujillo, Deputy City Attorney, San
Diego, to Charles D. Weisselberg (Sept. 12, 2000) (on file with author) (officers receive
monthly legal updates from the district attorney's office).
175. E.g. , Letter from Matthew Etcheverry, Litigation Unit, Kern County Sheriff's
Dep't, to Charles D. Weisselberg (Oct. 5, 2000) (on file with author) (department relies
upon POST's Leaming Domain 16, and does "not deviate from, nor embellish this area of
the law"); Letter from Lt. Ernie Smedlund, Santa Clara Sheriff's Dep't, to Charles D.
Weisselberg (Aug. 29, 2000) (on file with author) (training has been not to question suspects
"outside Miranda" and so "our practice has remained the same as it was prior to the Peevy
decision"); Telephone Conversation with Sgt. Jeff Israel, Oakland Police Dep't. (Aug. 24,
2000) (Peevy, Henry, Butts and Dickerson have not affected training because the department
has not trained officers to question "outside Miranda").
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Summary

Though statewide training is not uniform, it has generally changed
in the wake of the recent Miranda decisions. After the Ninth Circuit's
rulings in Henry and Butts, both POST and the Attorney General's
Office softened their positions. POST issued seemingly contradictory
videotapes: one tells officers not to question in violation of Miranda;
the other reports on Butts and gives the decision a narrow interpreta
tion, implying that it is permissible for officers to question "outside
Miranda" so long as they do so carefully. POST has not broadcast any
videos on the Supreme Court's opinion in Dickerson, though it re
ported the Fourth Circuit's ruling. After the Supreme Court decided
Dickerson (and denied certiorari in Butts) , however, the written train
ing from POST, the Attorney General and law enforcement organiza
tions has generally come to counsel adherence to Miranda, with a po
tentially enormous hiccup: POST has told instructors that
impeachment exception "procedures" are a matter of local policy. Fu
ture researchers may wish to study the impact of POST's equivocation
upon law enforcement officers in California.
There are significant differences at the county and local level as
well. Some law enforcement agencies have directed officers not to
question "outside Miranda." Other agencies may teach police about
the recent decisions or simply expect officers to learn about the rulings
in off-site courses.
One of the most striking aspects of the training materials is simply
how little changed after the California Supreme Court declared in
Peevy that questioning "outside Miranda" is "illegal" and "miscon
duct" and that Miranda and Edwards impose affirmative duties upon
officers. POST and the Attorney General's Office acknowledged but
failed to respect the justices' ruling. Neither agency made any effort to
halt the practice of questioning "outside Miranda. " County prosecu
tors have seemed more willing to instruct their staff and local police to
follow Peevy and not question in violation of Miranda. With respect to
county sheriffs and local police, apart from one exception,176 local
agencies did not appear to direct officers to cease questioning "outside
Miranda" until after the Ninth Circuit held in Butts that police officers
"who intentionally violate the rights protected by Miranda must ex
pect to have to defend themselves in civil actions."177 The ruling in
Dickerson seems to have reaffirmed this new instruction by undercut-

176. The one exception is the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. See supra note
164 and accompanying text.
177. Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999). The sam
ple of county sheriffs and police departments is, however, quite small and it is difficult to
state this result as more than one researcher's impression.
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ting any argument that Miranda's procedures are nonconstitutional
and merely optional.
There are several troubling explanations for the general malaise
after Peevy. One is that law enforcement officials felt free to disregard
Peevy's normative statements because they were not backed with sig
nificant sanctions. Another is that law enforcement officials disagreed
with the opinion and were simply waiting for a final ruling from the
United States Supreme Court.178 The second explanation is disturbing
because Peevy is a decision from the state's highest court, which rou
tinely decides constitutional questions. If officials disagreed with the
ruling, they could have counseled officers to adhere to Miranda and
Peevy pending a decision from the U.S. Supreme Court. By and large,
however, officials cited the portion of Peevy that advantaged police
and ignored the part of Peevy that did not.179 Nor did officials issue
new training materials after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Peevy.

Finally, another striking aspect of the training materials is simply
that they vary so much. Perhaps this should not be surprising. County
district attorneys and sheriffs are elected. Police chiefs are appointed
by local officials. Trainers are, in turn, selected by managers within
their respective law enforcement agencies. The culture of each agency
may vary depending upon such factors as leadership from the top, cus
tom, local crime rates, law enforcement identity with the community
and resources. The variance in training appears to be a function of lo178. In February 2001, my students and I filed a brief in the California Supreme Court
in a case with a Miranda issue. We pointed out that many law enforcement officials did not
change their training in the wake of Peevy. See Brief of California Attorneys for Criminal
Justice, As Amicus Curiae, Supporting Petitioner, at 13-15, People v. Storm (No. S088712)
(Cal. Sup. Ct.) (filed Feb. 1, 2001). In response, the State Attorney General argued that
"[w]hile this Court's decision in Peevy clearly foreshadowed the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Dickerson . . . , which held that Miranda and its progeny were constitu
tional rules, as opposed to mere rules of evidence, Proposition 8 necessitated guidance from
the United States Supreme Court before Miranda and its progeny could be viewed as consti
tutionally based." People's Answer to Amicus Brief in Support of Appellant, at 2, People v.
Storm (No. S088712) (Cal. Sup. Ct.) (filed Mar. 23, 2001). Proposition 8 is a California initia
tive passed in 1982. It added a new section to the state constitution providing that "relevant
evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding." See CAL. CONST., art. I, § 28(d).
A later initiative, Proposition 1 15, which passed in 1990, amended the California
Constitution to provide that state courts should not construe the State Constitution to afford
greater rights than the federal Constitution. See CAL. CONST., art. I, § 24. While these sec
tions might require a state court to analyze federal constitutional law, neither section pro
vides that a state court's construction of federal constitutional law should not be authorita
tive or binding within California.
179. The apparent lack of respect for the state court's ruling on issues of federal law is
particularly disconcerting because it comes at a time when Congress has decided to require
federal courts to defer to state court rulings on issues of federal law that disfavor habeas
corpus petitioners. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (1) (West Supp. 2000) (habeas corpus relief
shall not be granted unless the state court's adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States").
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cal culture, as well as the energy, creativity and personality of particu
lar trainers. The difference among trainers and jurisdictions sharply
contrasts with the justices' perceptions of Miranda and Edwards. The
Supreme Court is fond of stating that a primary virtue of Miranda and
Edwards is their clarity and certainty.180 The next part of this Article
discusses whether Dickerson and the other recent Miranda decisions
may make this assertion true.
III. THE S TATIONHOUSE AFTER D ICKERSON
A.

Exclusionary R ules, Hortatory Statements
and the Culture of Police

The Supreme Court's ruling in Dickerson has given Miranda a
firm, constitutional footing, but has not - at least yet - altered the
contours of Miranda's exclusionary rule. Statements taken in violation
of Miranda may still be used for impeachment. Fruits of a Miranda
violation are still admissible. The public safety exception remains in
tact. Within the confines of the criminal case, so long as police do not
take an involuntary statement, officers still have "little to lose and
perhaps something to gain" by violating Miranda. 181 We have seen that
police training in California is generally shifting to encourage officers
to comply with Miranda. But we must then ask whether officers will
follow their new instructions and actually change what they do in the
stationhouse.
For decades, scholars have debated the virtues and vices of shaping
police behavior through exclusionary rules. In an insightful recent ar
ticle, Sharon Davies approaches the issue from another perspective.
Davies explains that an exclusionary rule may, in theory, represent ei
ther a "price" - a penalty that permits an officer to choose to cause
harm provided that she internalizes the costs - or a "sanction" - a
penalty that is attached to conduct that society considers morally
wrong and seeks to prevent.182 Some of the training materials that en
courage police to question "outside Miranda" expressly characterize
Miranda's exclusionary rule as a value-neutral pricing scheme.183 This
1 80. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990) ("The merit of the
Edwards decision lies in the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application.");
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) ("We have repeatedly emphasized the virtues
of a bright-line rule in cases following Edwards as well as Miranda."); Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) ("Whatever the defects, if any, of (the] relatively rigid requirement
that interrogation must cease upon the accused's request for an attorney, Miranda's holding

has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in
conducting custodial interrogation . . . . ") .
181. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
182. Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion
REV. 1 275, 1 277-79 (2000).

-

A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. CAL. L.

183. Under this view, there is nothing inherently wrong with questioning "outside
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characterization matters because sanctions establish normative goals
and generally also provide greater incentives for compliance, assuming
that the legal obligation is enforced by a reasonable penalty.184
Davies argues that Miranda's exclusionary rule is most properly
seen as a sanction and not a price, 185 and this seems correct after
Dickerson and the other recent Miranda decisions. Even if officers are
trained about these decisions, however, Miranda's exclusionary rule
still provides few incentives for law enforcement compliance. Peevy
holds that deliberate, pre-meditated violations of Miranda and
Edwards may nevertheless yield statements that can be used for im
peachment. Assuming that Dickerson and the other recent decisions
firmly reject the notion that Miranda and Edwards represent mere
value-neutral rules of evidence, and that Miranda's exclusionary rule
is a sanction not a price, the question remains whether the moral force
of these rulings can carry the day in the stationhouse.186 There may be
particular reason for skepticism, inasmuch as the hortatory language
in Peevy went mostly unheeded. The incentive to bring real change in
the stationhouse must stem from a force other than Miranda's exclu
sionary rule or judicial declarations about the legitimacy of Miranda,
even after Dickerson.
One possibility is that officers may be induced to follow Miranda
by the fear that deliberate questioning "outside Miranda" may lead to
an involuntary statement. Officers who violate Miranda and obtain a
statement that is later ruled involuntary may jeopardize a prosecution
because the statement and, likely, its fruits will be inadmissible for any

Miranda." It simply has an evidentiary consequence - a "price" - that may be internalized
by prosecutors and police. See, e.g. , SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, § 7.48b (Rev. July 1998)
("(I]f you fail to comply with the Miranda guidelines in a non-coercive way, although any
statement you obtain will be inadmissible at trial to prove guilt (i.e., in the prosecution's
'case-in-chief'), that is the only 'penalty.' ) ; SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, § 7.40b (Rev.
Mar. 1997) ("(T]he Miranda decision is not a code of conduct setting forth how police must
conduct their investigations in the field."); Videotape, supra note 21, transcript reprinted in
Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 191 ("[Miranda is] a court-created decision that affects the ad
missibility of testimonial evidence and that's all it is. . . . The only consequence of your talk
ing to somebody who has invoked his rights is we will not be able to use his statement in the
case in chief in trial against him.").
"

184. As Davies explains, there is a sharp discontinuity in liability when a sanctioning
penalty is in place. Actors nearing the line separating permissible and forbidden conduct will
not balance costs and benefits in the margin, but will tend to conform to the rule. See Davies,
supra note 182, at 1290-92. Here, especially, Davies heavily draws upon the work of Robert
Cooter. See id. at 1291 nn.65-69 and accompanying text; Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanc
tions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).
185. See Davies, supra note 182, at 1296-97, 1314-15.
186. Applying Davies' theory, it may be that Miranda's legal obligation is not backed by
a suffidently strong penalty to gain the incentive effects of characterizing the exclusionary
rule as a sanction instead of a price. If the sanction is not strong, actors nearing the line be
tween permissible and impermissible conduct will not be deterred from simply balancing
their own costs and benefits in the margin.
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purpose.187 For this to prove a realistic deterrent, however, courts
would have to be willing to find involuntariness far more frequently
than at present. In Henry v. Kernan, the Ninth Circuit seemed to un
derstand the powerful psychological impact of questioning over a
Miranda invocation, telling a suspect that he can have an attorney and
then affirmatively denying the request for one.188 But unless many
other courts find statements involuntary on similar facts, this will be
unlikely to alter the way that many officers conduct stationhouse in
terrogations. Indeed, law enforcement training was not substantially
modified after the court of appeals decided Henry.
A more plausible candidate for change agent is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As we have seen, the ruling in Butts appears to have prompted many
state and local officials to alter their training. Even so, it is difficult to
conclude that the risk of civil rights liability - or more precisely, po
lice training about the risk of civil rights liability - can alone trans
form interrogation practices. Few suspects who are questioned "out
side Miranda" are likely to sue police; the suspects rarely will be
sympathetic plaintiffs, and the amount of damages will probably be
small.189 Further, departments will most likely indemnify the defendant
officers, making the possibility of financial loss for any individual offi
cer quite slim. The risk of § 1983 liability, however, is much more apt
to alter police behavior in the stationhouse if it encourages sheriffs,
police chiefs, and department supervisors to follow Miranda (perhaps
in an effort to avoid municipal liability, the cost of defending lawsuits,
or humiliation), and if these leaders endeavor to make compliance
with Miranda a departmental norm.
Training is not likely to change longstanding interrogation prac
tices within a law enforcement agency without substantial reinforce
ment, particularly if officers understand that courts will still allow lim
ited use of an "outside Miranda" statement. If supervisors wish to
imbue respect for Miranda, they must themselves take Miranda seri
ously and signal that they prefer their officers to honor an invocation,
even when doing so means losing an opportunity to gain useful infor
mation or evidence. And the message must be reinforced, if necessary,
through discipline of errant officers. The risk of §1983 liability may in
fluence conduct within a department, but ultimately a change in cul
ture must be brought on by police themselves.

187. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
188. See 197 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the officer "took unfair advan
tages" of the compelling pressures inherent in a custodial interrogation, and that " [a]ny
minimally trained police officer should have known such pressure was improper and likely to
produce involuntary statements").
189. Cf. Perrin et al., supra note 87, at 739-40 (discussing why few victims of Fourth
Amendment violations sue under § 1983).
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Fieldwork seems to support this conclusion. In the early 1960s,
Jerome Skolnick closely observed officers in the Oakland Police De
partment.190 His observations took place less than a decade after Cali
fornia adopted an exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment viola
tions.191 Skolnick concluded that the norms within police organizations
"are more powerful than court decisions in shaping police behavior
and that actually the process of interaction between the two is what
accounts
ultimately
for
how
police
behave."192
From
Skolnick's perspective, as long as an officer could justify a search to
organizational superiors, the worst the officer could expect from an
illegal search would be the loss of a conviction. Further, if the search
turned up contraband, the "moral burden" would shift to the suspect
and the illegality of the search would likely be tempered by the dis
covery of the evidence.193 Between 1984 and 1988, Skolnick and his
colleague, Jonathan Simon, conducted additional observations in
Oakland. They concluded that officers' adherence to the Fourth
Amendment had improved significantly.194 They credited the change
to procedures throughout "the policing enterprise" designed to en
force the values of the Fourth Amendment and noted that " [t]he idea
of enforcing the Fourth Amendment has become normalized."195
Training in departmental and legal rules was an important part of the
change, but it was only a part.196 At about the same time that Simon
and Skolnick returned to Oakland, Myron Orfield Jr. surveyed law en
forcement officers in Chicago; 95% of the responding officers stated
that police sometimes lied in court to avoid suppression.197 More re190. His observations are published in JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT
(3d ed. 1994).

TRIAL

191. California adopted its rule in People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955), six years
before the United States Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and
applied the exclusionary rule to all the states.
192. SKOLNICK, supra note 190, at 214.
193. Id. at 215.
194. See Jonathan Simon & Jerome H. Skolnick, Federalism, the Exclusionary Rule, and
the Police, in POWER DIVIDED: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM
75, 80 (Harry N. Scheiber & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 1989).
195. Id.; see also SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF
D ISCRETION I N CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990 at 152-53 (1993) (describing how agency offi

cials develop their own group norms about how things should be done, which are highly re
sistant to externally imposed changes).

196. In addition to police training, other important parts of the change in departmental
norms included: greater involvement of prosecutors with police; increased visibility of police
practices; police managers' acceptance of legal norms as a mechanism for controlling line
officers; and use of suppression hearings to reinforce police appreciation for legal proce
dures. See Simon & Skolnick, supra note 194, at 80-85.
197. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An
Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CH I . L. REV. 1016, 1049 n.128 (1987).

The question was whether the respondents knew of any case in which a judge has "disbe
lieved police testimony at a suppression hearing." Id. A subsequent question asked how of-
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cently, Orfield surveyed judges, prosecutors and public defenders in
Chicago. He reported that judges and public defenders believe that
perjury is the major factor limiting the deterrent effect of the exclu
sionary rule.198 Further, 38% of his respondents think that police su
pervisors encourage perjury, and 67% of respondents believe that su
pervisors tolerate perjury.199 These reports confirm that culture and
leadership do matter.
If improper interrogation practices will not end without a change
in departmental culture, direction from the top is particularly impor
tant. It is significant that a number of agency heads issued orders after
Butts, instructing officers not to question "outside Miranda." Whether
these orders actually become norms internalized by detectives and su
pervisors who work in the stationhouse will depend upon continuing
training and reinforcement at all levels of the agency.
Finally, one might explore whether it is possible to determine the
impact of Dickerson apart from Butts. Dickerson confirms the view,
expressed in Butts, that Miranda imposes affirmative obligations. Sev
eral agencies have instructed officers to comply with Miranda after
Dickerson. And, certainly, Butts would not remain on the books had
Dickerson come out the other way. Yet the language of many of the
training materials leaves the strong impression that, but for the possi
bility of civil liability, training would not have changed.
B.

Section 1 983 Litigation After Dickerson

If it is true that the prospect of civil rights liability significantly en
courages police to comply with Miranda's commands, we should ask
whether Dickerson will facilitate this use of the civil rights laws.
Prior to Dickerson, most courts rejected efforts to assess liability
for Miranda violations under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The statute establishes a cause of action for state actors who
deprive people of rights "secured by the Constitution and laws."200 As
ten judges were "right in disbelieving police testimony"; no officer answered "never." Id. at
1050 n.129.
198. See Orfield, supra note 87, at 98.
199. Id. at 108. According to Orfield, 29% of the respondents believe that police superi
ors discourage perjury, but that many in this category suggested that the efforts at discour
agement were pro forma at best. Id. at 109.
200. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1995). Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), provides a counterpart for people whose constitutional rights
have been violated by federal officials.
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Susan Klein and others explain, the Supreme Court's characterization
of Miranda as "prophylactic" - arguably "nonconstitutional" - has
been a main obstacle to using the civil rights law to enforce Miranda;201
the federal courts have generally ruled that the failure to administer
Miranda warnings or honor an invocation of the right to counsel is not
itself cognizable under § 1983.202 Another obstacle has been the posi
tion taken by several circuits that a Fifth Amendment violation occurs
only after a statement is introduced in court.203 This would limit the
utility of §1983 by restricting its application to cases where an accused
was questioned in violation of Miranda and was subsequently indicted
or tried.
Dickerson may well lead courts to revisit the first (though not the
second) of these obstacles to civil rights liability. Dickerson acknowl201. See Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination
Clause and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 421-22 (1994) (noting, how
ever, other obstacles to the application of § 1983); see also Martin R. Gardner, Section 1983
A ctions Under Miranda: A Critical View of the Right to A void Interrogation, 30 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1277, 1294-97 (1993) (noting the cases that hold that Miranda is not a "right" guaran
teed by the Constitution, and so a violation cannot be raised under § 1983).
202. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that fail
ure to warn or honor an invocation violates only a prophylactic rule, and does not support a
§ 1983 suit); Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1998) (no liability under § 1983
for failure to give Miranda warnings); Mahan v. Plymouth County House of Corrections, 64
F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1995) (same); Neighbour v. Covert, 68 F.3d 1508, 1510 (2d Cir. 1995)
(same); Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1256 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Lucero v. Gunter, 17
F.3d 1347, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); Brock v. Logan County Sheriff's Dep't of Ark., 3
F.3d 1215, 1217 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1244 (9th Cir.) (no
cause of action for "benign" questioning in violation of Miranda), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 868
(1992); Warren v. City of Lincoln, Nebraska, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir.) (en bane) (no
liability for failure to warn or honor invocation), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Bennett
v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976) (same); see also Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F.3d 996,
1005 n.13 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Hensley with approval for the proposition that "a Miranda
violation, without additional evidence of police coercion giving rise to a constitutional viola
tion, does not state a cause of action under § 1983"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1119 (1994); Hen
sley v. Carey, 818 F.2d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Bennett with approval), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 965 (1987).
203. Compare Deshawn E., 156 F.3d at 348 (noting that a Miranda violation that
amounts to actual coercion based on outrageous governmental conduct can be basis for §
1983 suit, even though statement was not used in court), Weaver v. Brenner, 40 F.3d 527, 535
(2d Cir. 1 994) (liability where statement introduced at any criminal proceeding), and
Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1242-43 (holding that plaintiff can allege Fifth Amendment cause of ac
tion even though statement was not used in court), with Giuffre, 31 F.3d at 1256 (agreeing
with dissent in Cooper), Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993, 998 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that privi
lege against self-incrimination is not violated until evidence is admitted in a criminal case),
and Davis v. City of Charleston, Missouri, 827 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding no li
ability for failure to give Miranda warnings where statement not introduced at trial).
Cases holding that a Fifth Amendment violation may occur only when a statement is
actually introduced at trial seem contrary to decisions such as New Jersey v. Portash, 440
U.S. 450 (1979) (affirming reversal of conviction where defendant stayed off the stand be
cause of threatened impeachment use of immunized testimony), and Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (striking down statute that divested official of his political
office after he invoked the Fifth Amendment; no criminal charges were filed).
My own view is that a Fifth Amendment violation occurs in the stationhouse but may
occur again in court. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 179-81.
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edges the "prophylactic" label, but expressly rejects the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion "that the protections announced in Miranda are
not constitutionally required."204 Dickerson calls Miranda's procedures
a mandatory constitutional "rule," which Justice Scalia claims is some
thing short of a "right." While the majority's failure to find that a
breach of Miranda is a per se Fifth Amendment violation may be
driven by efforts to retain Miranda's current exclusionary rule,205 the
issue here is whether this matters in applying § 1983.206
Dickerson sheds some light on the issue by acknowledging the
Court's earlier holding in Withrow v. Williams,201 that Miranda viola
tions may be raised on federal habeas corpus. The federal habeas cor
pus statute provides relief for people held "in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States."208 According to
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Withrow "obviously assumes that Miranda is
of constitutional origin."209 There is a strong argument that a manda
tory "rule" that is "of constitutional origin" is indeed a "right" "se
cured by the Constitution." If someone convicted in violation of
Miranda is in custody "in violation of the Constitution," a person de
nied the protections of Miranda ought to be deemed denied a "right"
"secured by the Constitution." It is uncertain how this question will
now play out in the circuits, though Dickerson certainly augments the
argument in favor of using § 1983 to vindicate Miranda.210
204. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2333 (2000).
205. See supra notes 77�83 and accompanying text.
206. The question clearly weighs on the mind of Justice Scalia, who asked during the
Dickerson argument: "Now, do you think that a policeman who fails to Mirandize the sus

pect, obtains a confession without having Mirandized them and then introduces that confes
sion in court, is subject to suit? Do you know of any suit that has ever been brought?"
Transcript of Oral Argument, Dickerson v. United States, 2000 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 41, at
*2-3 (Apr. 19, 2000).
207. 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
208. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
209. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 n.3.
210. One additional point bears mentioning. Evan Caminker has suggested that, under
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), Congress might lack the power to impose civil
liability upon police officers for interrogations that violate Miranda. When Congress enacts

laws to remedy or prevent constitutional violations, "[t)here must be a congruence and pro
portionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end." Id. at 520. Dickerson should ease the burden of establishing congruence and propor
tionality. By rejecting the characterization of Miranda's procedures as nonconstitutional
prophylactic rules - and, particularly, by its treatment of Withrow
the Court made it
more apparent that civil rights lawsuits for Miranda violations are suits to remedy the spe
cific denial of constitutional rights. Thus, the civil rights remedy would be directly based
upon constitutional violations as defined by the Court and City of Boerne should prove no
obstacle. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-86 (2000) (finding that a stat
ute failed to meet the congruence and proportionality test because it prohibited substantially
more employment decisions than would be held unconstitutional under the Court's prece
dents). Further, to the extent that the laws permit damage actions (as opposed to actions
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief), there should be little difficulty establishing propor-
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There is another useful way of thinking about Miranda and
§ 1983, however. While the courts of appeals have thus far not been
kind to the claim that Miranda violations standing alone are cogniza
ble under § 1983, most would agree that officers and cities may be
sued for using coercion to obtain a statement.21 1 Yet a failure to advise
a suspect of the right to remain silent or to speak with a lawyer has
long been held to be probative of actual coercion. In Davis v. North
Carolina,212 the Court ruled a confession involuntary under the
Fourteenth Amendment, stating:
[T]hat a defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent or of his
right respecting counsel at the outset of interrogation, as is now required
by Miranda, is a significant factor in considering the voluntariness of
statements later made. This factor has been recognized in several of our
prior decisions dealing with standards of voluntariness. Thus, the fact
that Davis was never effectively advised of his rights gives added weight
to the other circumstances described below which made his confessions
involuntary.21 3

In Butts, the
Miranda may

Ninth Circuit found that the failure to comply with
be a significant part of a civil rights plaintiff's proof of
coercion, and that officers who deliberately question "outside
Miranda" are not entitled to qualified immunity.214 By reaffirming the
connection between Miranda and the Constitution, Dickerson
strengthens these conclusions. After Butts and Dickerson, it should be
much easier for a civil rights plaintiff to get to trial if she was ques
tioned in violation of Miranda and there is at least some additional
evidence tending to show coercion. The plaintiff should be able to
avoid summary judgment - a Miranda violation should, standing

tionality. Finally, the civil rights remedy would be directed only to state actors, police offi
cers and municipalities that function "under color of' state law. See United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (2000) (holding that a statute directed at private individuals
was not congruent and proportional).
211. See, e.g. , Weaver v. Brenner, 40 F.3d 527, 535 (2d Cir. 1994) (§ 1983 action may be
brought for use or derivative use of coerced confession in any criminal proceeding); Rex v.
Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 843 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that "[e)xtracting an involuntary confes
sion by coercion is a due process violation," actionable under § 1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
967 (1985) .
212. 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
213. Id. at 740-41 (citations omitted); see also Withrow, 507 U.S. at 693-94 (noting that
courts look at the totality of circumstances to determine whether a confession was voluntary,
and those circumstances "include the failure of police to advise the defendant of his rights to
remain silent and to have counsel present during custodial interrogation"); Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 399-401 (1978) (finding a statement to be involuntary based in part
upon the fact that the accused's request for counsel was ignored).
214. See Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Justice v. Butts, 195 F.2d 1039, 1047-49 (9th Cir. 1999); see
also Rex, 753 F.2d at 843-44 (finding that the plaintiff had stated a civil rights cause of action
for coercion where, among other things, he alleged a Miranda violation).

·
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alone, establish at least a genuine issue of material fact215 as to actual
coercion - the ultimate question of actual coercion should go to the
jury, and the defendant officers should be denied qualified immunity.
For this reason, Butts and Dickerson together substantially increase
the threat of civil liability (or, certainly, the threat of costly litigation)
for officers and departments that continue to question "outside
Miranda." One hopes that this increased threat will be instrumental in
encouraging police chiefs, sheriffs, and supervisors to change depart
mental norms.
CONCLUSION
Dickerson v. United States left Miranda standing, but with all of the
exceptions and modifications that have been crafted during the last
thirty-five years. As we have seen, Miranda's exclusionary rule does
not give officers much of an incentive to cease questioning a suspect
who invokes the right to counsel or the right to remain silent. Officers
who comply will gain no further information. On the other hand, in
terrogators who continue to question may obtain statements useful for
impeachment and they may learn about additional evidence or wit
nesses. For these reasons, police in California (and perhaps elsewhere)
have developed the practice of questioning "outside Miranda. "
This Article explores whether Dickerson and other recent Miranda
decisions may bring an end to this practice. An examination of state
wide and local police training materials shows that the risk of civil li
ability appears to be at least as significant as Dickerson in leading po
lice agencies to instruct personnel to comply with Miranda. Miranda's
exclusionary rule, even after Dickerson, remains so weak that law en
forcement agencies need the additional incentive of the threat of civil
rights liability to follow Miranda's procedures. Dickerson is, never
theless, important because it confirms Miranda's constitutional foun
dation and may enhance the ability of civil rights plaintiffs to deter
deliberate violations of Miranda.
Whether the practice of questioning "outside Miranda" will actu
ally cease in California remains to be seen. Legislative efforts to end
the practice have not yet proved successful. Training is necessary but
not sufficient to lead officers to comply with Miranda. Miranda re
mains on the law books. Whether it will survive in the stationhouse
will depend upon the inclination of sheriffs, police chiefs and supervi
sory personnel to make compliance with Miranda the norm in their
departments. That inclination may be nourished by the palpable threat
of § 1983 liability but, whatever its source, it must ultimately come

215. See FED. R. Clv. P. 56(c) ("The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.").
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from within the departments themselves. We cannot expect police of
ficers to take Miranda seriously unless their leaders do as well.
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APPENDIX A:
SAMPLE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT REQUEST .
SENT TO A POLICE DEPARTMENT

August 17, 2000
[Name and Address]
Dear Chief
_
_
_

I am writing to request release of public records, writings and
documents pursuant to the Public Records Act, Cal. Gov. Code
§§6250, et seq.
I am researching how police interrogation practices, and how liti
gation over the admissibility of statements, have been affected by four
recent court decisions: People v. Peevy, 17 Cal.4th 1184, 73
Cal.Rptr.2d 865 (1998), Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir.
1999), California A ttorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039
(9th Cir. 1999), and Dickerson v. United States,
U.S.
120 S.Ct.
2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000). I am particularly interested in the prac
tice of questioning "outside Miranda," and in any training about that
practice in light of these cases. I therefore ask that you provide the
following:
1.
All training bulletins, manuals, videotapes, policies,
seminar materials, case summaries and other docu
ments relating to officers' duties under Miranda v.
A rizona, that are dated or that were distributed on or
after May 7, 1998 (the date People v. Peevy was de
cided);
2.
All training bulletins, manuals, videotapes, policies,
seminar materials, case summaries and other docu
ments that discuss or refer to People v. Peevy, 17
Cal.4th 1 184, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 (1998), Henry v.
Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1999), California
A ttorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039
(9th Cir. 1999), or Dickerson v. United States,
U.S.
120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000);
3.
All training bulletins, manuals, videotapes, policies,
seminar materials, case summaries and other docu
ments that discuss or refer td the ability of officers to
question a suspect in custody after he or she has in
voked the right to remain silent or the right to counsel
(i.e., question "outside Miranda").
_

_,

_

_,
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Please note that I am not seeking copies of any police reports or
motions or briefs in any individual cases. I am not seeking to obtain
any reports of any individual interrogations. Rather, I am only seeking
to determine, broadly, how sworn personnel have been trained in light
of these decisions.
I request that you determine whether you will comply with this re
quest within ten days, as required by Cal. Gov. Code §6253. Please tell
me whether there is any copying fee for these materials, and I will
promptly provide payment. Finally, should you determine not to make
all of the requested documents available, I request that you indicate
which items you will not turn over for inspection and specify the rea
sons for refusal to comply with this request, pursuant to Cal. Gov.
Code §6255.
Thank you very much for your assistance. Please call me with any
questions at all about this request.
Very truly yours,
/s/
Charles D. Weisselberg
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APPENDIX B:
AGENCY RESPONSES TO PUBLIC RECORDS ACT REQUESTS
County Agencies
(R=Agency responded to request)
Responses Received From
County

Population as
of April 2000216

District
Attorney
R
R
R

Sheriff
R
R

Alameda
Fresno
Humboldt

1 ,443,741
799,407
126,518

Kern

661,645
9,519,338

R

2,846,289

R

1,545,387
1 ,223,499
1,709,434
2,813,833
776,733
563,598

R

R

R

R

1 ,682,585
163,256
25,875,263

R
R
10/14

Los Angeles
Orange
Riverside
Sacramento
San Bernardino
San Diego
San Francisco
San Joaquin
Santa Clara
Shasta
Total

R
R

R
R
R
R
9/14

Response rate for District Attorneys: 71 % .
Response rate for Sheriffs: 64 % .

216. Population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau and are available at http://fact
finder/census.gov (last visited Apr. 20, 2001 ).
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City Police Departments
(R=Agency responded to request)
Population, as of
April 2000217

Responses
Received

Bakersfield
Eureka
Fresno
Los Angeles
Oakland

247,057
26,128
427,652
3,694,820
399,482

R

Oceanside
Palm Springs
Redding

161,029
42,807
80,865

City

Riverside
Sacramento
San Bernardino
San Diego
San Francisco
San Jose
Santa Ana
Stockton
Total

255,156
407,018
185,401
1,223,400
776,733
894,943
337,977
243,771
9,404,239

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
10/16

Response rate: 62.5 % .

217. Population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau and are available at http://fact
finder/census.gov (last visited Apr. 20, 2001 ).

